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Fifteen and Thirty Five--Class Warfare in Subchapter K of the Internal 
Revenue Code:  The Taxation of Human Capital Upon the Receipt of a 
Proprietary Interest in a Business Enterprise 
 
     By 
            Philip F. Postlewaite1 
  Forthcoming Spring 2009 in the Virginia Tax Review 
 
Service providers (aka executives) to partnerships and to corporations confront a number of 
choices as to how their compensatory arrangement may be structured and the tax consequences 
thereof.  In the simplest case, an individual may render services to an enterprise in return for cash 
payments over the period of service.  In this non-equity setting, the issue is straightforward and 
non-controversial.  The service provider is treated as receiving ordinary income for services 
rendered.  The return on his or her expenditure of human capital is taxed at progressive rates.  
 
Once the relationship between the service provider and the enterprise becomes more 
complicated through the service provider’s receipt of an equity interest in the enterprise, the tax 
treatment of the return becomes more complex.  If the service provider receives an equity interest 
in return for services, the issue of whether the receipt of, and return on, the equity interest is 
attributable to human capital or invested capital is confronted.  A tension arises between 
conceptualizing the receipt of and return on an equity interest and the economic enhancement 
which it generates as a return on human capital, generating ordinary income, or as a return on 
invested capital, which in certain settings may be taxed preferentially as capital gain.   
 
In the corporate context, stock in the corporation may be issued in return for the rendition of 
future services.  It may be transferred outright, i.e., free and clear, or be restricted, i.e., 
conditioned upon the rendition of services for a fixed period of time.  Various tax issues are 
confronted—when is the income taken into account, what amount is taken into account, what is 
the character of the income from such receipt, and whether and to what extent its compensatory 
origin must be segregated from any subsequent appreciation in the equity interest.   
 
Subchapter K raises similar issues in the services-for-equity context regarding partnerships, but 
the tax consequences arise under a single tax, rather than double tax, regime for the enterprise.  
However, in the partnership context, three types of equity interests may be utilized for 
compensatory purposes, i.e., a capital interest with an attendant right to profits, a restricted 
capital with profits interest, and a pure profits interest. 
 
                                            
1 Harry R. Horrow Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Tax Program, Northwestern 
University School of Law.  © by Philip F. Postlewaite 2008.  The Article will appear in the Spring 
2009 issue of the Virginia Tax Review.  I would like to thank the following individuals for their 
insightful commentary:  Tom Brennan, Stephanie Hoffer, Jeff Kwall, Adam Rosenzweig, Robert 
Wootton, and Eric Zolt.  Notwithstanding their efforts regarding the Article, any defects in, or 
shortcomings of, the work are exclusively attributable to my inadequacies.  Additional thanks are 
due to Krystle Lamprecht, my research assistant, who diligently assisted in organizing, critiquing, 
and improving the Article.  Finally, I am most appreciative of the invitation to discuss my views on 
this issue with the Tax Section of the Indianapolis Bar Association in October, 2008, the invitation 
from which was the genesis for this Article.   
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Critics have recently advocated a change in the tax treatment of the return from a compensatory 
profits interest in a partnership.  They conclude that the current tax treatment of the receipt of and 
return on such an interest is seriously flawed, violating fundamental principles of tax policy. 
Unfortunately, such advocacy is limited to a narrow analysis of the results generated by a 
compensatory receipt of a profits interest and lacks a thorough comparison with, and analysis of, 
the treatment of the traditional compensatory equity transfers in the two dominant business 
contexts employed in the United States economy, i.e., partnerships and corporations.  This Article 
provides a broader discussion of compensatory equity transfers (capital interests as well as 
profits interests) in the partnership context and discusses the similarities and dissimilarities 
between these compensatory arrangements and those arising in the corporate setting.  By doing 
so, this Article illustrates the erroneous assumption that profits interests derive unique and unfair 
tax treatment.  
 
The recent assault on the status quo treatment of a profits interest in a partnership has gathered 
momentum, in large part due to the inflammatory rhetoric which attends the academic 
commentary and the focus by the media on the economic success of private equity ventures.  
Bills have been introduced in Congress to mandate that such receipts generate ordinary income, 
rather than preferential capital gain, to the recipient.  To date, none has been enacted.  However, 
with the economic freefall and the Congressional need to generate additional tax revenues, the 
issue of the proper taxation of a compensatory transfer of a profits interest in a partnership will 
likely be revisited in the next legislative session. 
 
By focusing on but one of the five traditional types of available equity transfers (a profits interest), 
most of the academic commentary has confused, rather than clarified, the need for reform.  The 
treatment of the return on human capital and on invested capital has never been as clear or as 
singular as commentators suggest.  The Code, for sound policy reasons, refrains from 
disentangling the return on human capital from the return on invested capital when the service 
provider “re-invests” his or her return on human capital in the enterprise by foregoing annual 
compensation.  With regard to profits interests, the role of § 702(b), which requires that all 
partners in a partnership, regardless of how they acquired ownership of their interest, 
characterize the nature of their share of the income at the partnership, not the partner, level, is 
overlooked.  Additionally, compensatory profits interests possess implicit, if not explicit, 
restrictions on transfer and thus require treatment akin to that accorded restricted capital interests 
in a partnership and restricted corporate stock.  Finally, some of the treatment accorded profits 
interests is attributable to the fundamental differences between the tax treatment of partnerships 
(single level of tax) and corporations (double level of tax), which some critics either minimize or 
ignore.   
 
Accordingly, this Article critiques proposals for change with regard to the suggested modification 
of the tax treatment of profits interests, in large measure by illustrating the misperception of the 
current operation of Subchapter K of the Code and enterprise equity compensation as a whole.  
The entire field of compensatory transfers of equity interests and the allocation of the return 
therefrom to human capital and/or invested capital is surveyed from a tax policy standpoint.  In 
this broader context, the status quo (subject to an elective defect) from a normative standpoint is 
equal, or superior, to any of the proposals recently advanced.   
 
Finally, with the misdirected emphasis on the tax treatment of profits interests, the real 
opportunity for reform of the area is overlooked.  The ability to recognize income in the year of 
receipt of a restricted compensatory equity interest under § 83(b) permits recipients to minimize 
the impact of the progressive rates.  This treatment is far more inconsistent with the taxation of 
human capital than is the current tax treatment of compensatory profits interests.  As a modest 
proposal for reform, this Article advances the repeal of § 83(b) which, if enacted, would constitute 
significantly broader reform than recent proposals and would result in an overall improvement of 
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A recent article, entitled “Two and Twenty:  Taxing Partnership Profits in Private 
Equity Funds,” has received significant attention not only in the academic world, 
but on Capital Hill as well.2  The author joined issue with the current tax 
treatment of a compensatory transfer of a profits interest in a partnership.  The 
article built on prior academic criticism of the current tax treatment of 
compensatory transfers of such interests3 and has spawned additional ac
4
ademic 
ommentary.    
ax 
 in 
e continuum of possible receipts of compensatory 
terests in an enterprise?     
, from a 
 be 
e expenditure of human capital different from the investment of 
uman capital?  
 
 is limited 
 a single type of compensatory transfer in the partnership context.   
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This topic is but one piece of a persistent and perplexing policy issue of the t
law:  how is the receipt of a compensatory interest in an enterprise taxed
cases where the recipient contributes only his or her services toward its 
success?  What are the tax consequences under current law and is that 
treatment consistent across th
in
 
Of equal importance, regardless of the current treatment of such receipts
theoretical tax policy standpoint, how should compensatory transfers of 
proprietary interests in an enterprise be taxed?  Arguably the recipient is 
investing exclusively human capital in the endeavor.  When should he or she
taxed and at what rate?  What is the relationship, if any, between returns on 
human capital and returns on invested capital?  When does one end and the 
other begin?  Is th
h
 
Instead of addressing the tax treatment of compensatory transfers of equity 
interests in partnerships and corporations as a whole, critics focus on a detailed
evaluation and critique only of the taxation of compensatory transfers of profits 
interests in a partnership.  Thus, instead of an overall comparison of each of the 
five traditional compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise and an 
evaluation of the similarities and differences among them, the analysis
to
 
2 Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty:  Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008).  Regarding legislative proposals on the topic in the publicly-traded 
partnership arena, see Baccus-Grassley Bill, S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007) proposing the 
amendment of the definition of publicly traded partnerships under § 7704.  See also Tax 
Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong., 1st Sess (Oct 25, 2007) at proposed 
§ 1201 (proposing the adoption of § 710 requiring that all disproportionate profits interests 
generate ordinary income). 
 
3 See, Mark Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners, 48 Tax L. Rev. 
69 (1992); Leo L. Schmolka, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services: Let 
Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 Tax L. Rev. 287, 312 n. 105 (1991); Laura Cunningham, 
Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services, 47 Tax L. Rev. 247 (1991).  
  
4 See Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell Engler, The Carried Interest Controversy: Let’s Not Get 
Carried Away, 61 Tax L. Rev 121 (2008) (allowing an interest deduction). 
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Dissatisfied with the status quo of those tax consequences, a wide range of 
proposed improvements are advanced for the area.  Regardless of the particular 
proposal advanced, as regards the current tax treatment of a compensatory 
transfer of a profits interest in a partnership, some assert that “the status quo is 
untenable as a matter of tax policy.”5 
 
Ignoring the adage that “fools rush in where wise men fear to go,” I suggest that 
the current tax treatment of a profits interest is in fact logical by illustrating the 
consistency of that treatment when integrated into the overall approach of the 
Internal Revenue Code with regard to the compensatory receipt of an equity 
interest in a business enterprise.  Critics examine only part of the evidence in 
compiling their case against the status quo.  Furthermore, they fail to integrate 
the full fabric of Subchapter K and the taxation of partners and partnerships into 
their assessment of the area.   
 
While I share their concern about the development of sound tax policy for the 
treatment of any and all compensatory receipts, I conclude that the populist 
rhetoric is hyperbolic6 and critics have focused on a small and relatively 
insignificant part of the “problem.”7  The recent, intense scrutiny of a single 
industry comprised of private equity firms and hedge funds precludes a full 
understanding of the tax consequences of a compensatory receipt of a profits 
interest, which in actuality comports with, rather than diverts from, the goals of 
sound tax policy.  Thus, the conclusion that compensatory transfers of profits 
interests in a partnership are treated more favorably than other transfers under 
current law is mistaken.8 
                                            
5 Fleischer, supra note 2 at 4. 
 
6 See, e.g., Equity Managers’ Loophole; Billion Dollar Breaks, PHILADELPHIA ENQUIRER, Sept. 17, 
2007, at A16; Close This Loophole: Time to Fix ‘Carried Interest’ Tax Dodge, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15, 
2007, at A30; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Lori Montgomery, Wall Street’s Lucrative Tax Break Is Under 
Fire, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 3, 2007, at A01; Close Hedge Fund Loophole, BOSTON HERALD, 
July 29, 2007, at 024; Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings of Private Equity, NEW YORK 
TIMES, July 29, 2007, at 4; Wealth Money Managers Make More, Get Taxed Less, USA TODAY, 
July 23, 2007, at 10A; Tax Breaks for the Rich: Why Should Hedge Fund Managers Pay Less 
Than Waitresses?, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, July 14, 2007, at B-7.  
 
7 Criticism of the current treatment of the tax law of compensatory transfers of partnership 
interests, as discussed in greater detail below, ignores the factor of risk and how it differentiates 
some equity transfers from others; fails to appreciate the Congressional recognition that returns 
on human capital are entitled to conversion from ordinary income taxed at the highest progressive 
rates to capital gain which is taxed preferentially; minimizes the implicit, if not explicit, restrictions 
inherent in a compensatory transfer of a profits interest in a partnership; inaccurately assumes 
that most profits interests result in a character conversion of the return; and fails to integrate the 
legislative purpose behind § 702(b) of characterizing income at the partnership level into their 
analysis. 
 
8 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4:  “The conversion of labor income into capital gain is 
contrary to the general approach of the Internal Revenue Code and diverges from the treatment 
of other compensatory interests.  Partnership profits interests are treated more favorably than 
other economically similar methods of compensation, such as partnership capital interests, 
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The narrowness of this inquiry precludes consideration of the overall proper tax 
treatment of human capital in compensatory transfers of equity interests in an 
enterprise.  The exclusive focus on high-profile, recent developments in a single 
industry foreclosed an examination of the entirety of the issue of compensatory 
equity transfers across the continuum of business enterprise.9  In fact, under 
current law, returns on human capital frequently become invested capital if not 
withdrawn from an enterprise. With a broader focus, the current tax treatment of 
such transfers on the whole becomes rational and defensible from a tax policy 
standpoint.10   
 
Finally, the true “theoretical” quirk in the congressional treatment of the area 
under current law is the elective provision of § 83(b).  This taxpayer option 
undermines the proper taxation of human capital and generates greater abuse to 
the tax system than the current tax treatment of profits interests in a 
partnership.11  
II. Tax Consequences Under Current Law to a Service Provider 
of a Compensatory Transfer of an Equity Interest in an 
Enterprise 
 
In order to determine whether the tax treatment of a profits interest in a 
partnership is more favorable than the treatment of other compensatory transfers 
of enterprise equity, a review is necessary of the current treatment of a service 
provider upon the receipt of an equity interest in an enterprise in the traditional 
contexts, i.e., a corporation, the tax consequences of the use of which are 
specified in Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code, and a partnership, the 
                                                                                                                                  
restricted stock, or at-the-money nonqualified stock options (the corporate equivalent of a 
partnership profits interest).” 
 
9 See supra notes 2 and 6.  While Congress has permitted the recipients of compensatory 
interests in partnerships and corporations generally to be taxed on the return from human capital 
at preferential rates, it has deviated from its own treatment through the enactment of the elective 
provision of §83(b).  I.R.C. § 83(b) (allowing for recognition of restricted property received in 
return for services in the year such property was received). 
 
10 See discussion infra at notes 32-62 and accompanying text. 
  
11 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 5:  “This quirk in the partnership tax rules allows some of the richest 
workers in the country to pay tax on their labor income at a low effective rate.”  As discussed infra 
at notes 116-117 to and 192-194 and accompanying text, the § 83(b) election permits the 
recipient of a restricted compensatory interest to accelerate the time at which the tax 
consequences will be taken into account, which thereby affords the recipient the opportunity of 
minimizing the amount of income taxed at progressive rates. 
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tax consequences of the use of which are specified in Subchapter K.12  Without 
an examination of the topic as a whole, any analysis of the transfer of a 
partnership profits interest is incomplete and misleading.   
 
By comparing the results in the partnership and corporate context throughout the 
entire range of the traditional types of equity receipts13 by a service provider, one 
can glean the themes for the statutory and regulatory treatment of compensatory 
transfers.  Thereafter, consistencies and inconsistencies can be identified and 
proposals for reform can be advanced or critiqued.    
 
This survey will be generalized and offered in summary form.  For those with 
greater interest, treatises are available with thorough coverage of the tax 
consequences of compensatory transfers of equity interests in partnerships14 
and corporations.15  Any assessment of the status quo must focus on the vari
stages of the service provider’s relationship to his or her enterprise, i.e., from 
birth to grave. For purposes of illustration, I will utilize numerical examples 
involving simple, and at times somewhat unrealistic, settings.  Behavior in the 
real world is far more complex.
ous 
                                           
16  Nevertheless, the simplified settings should 
suffice for illustrating why advocates err when they conclude that the current tax 
treatment of a compensatory profits interest in a partnership violates sound tax 
policy. 
 
A. Pure Employee Status  
 
Advocates for reform typically examine the tax consequences of rendering 
services as a pure employee, which is utilized as a baseline and a point of 
comparison.  In order to grapple with the proper treatment of the return on the 
expenditure of human capital, this baseline is compared with the results arising 
 
12 Typically, limited liability companies are taxed as partnerships for tax purposes. See generally 
Arthur B. Willis, John S. Pennell, and Philip F. Postlewaite, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION ch 1, 3 
(WG&L 6th ed. 1997). 
 
13 The dominant enterprises in the current economic environment through which to conduct profit 
making activity are the partnership (which includes limited liability companies) and the 
corporation.  With respect to traditional compensatory transfers of an equity interest, two are 
possible in the corporate context (stock and restricted stock) while three exist in the partnership 
context (capital interest, restricted capital interest, and profits interest). 
 
14 See generally Willis et al, supra note 12. 
 
15 See generally Boris I. Bittker and James S. Eustice, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (WG&L 7th ed 2006). 
 
16 For purposes of comparison, the examples contrast pure employee status with an exclusive 
receipt of a compensatory equity interest.  In the real world, the latter settings typically involve a 
combination of receipts through which the service provider receives both an annual salary or 
compensatory payment (“A man’s gotta eat.”) and an interest in the equity of the enterprise. 
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when human capital is expended in return for the receipt of an equity interest in 
an enterprise.   
In the case of pure employee status, the executive draws regular compensation 
without sharing in the economic results of the enterprise.  The enterprise may 
profit immeasurably or teeter on the verge of bankruptcy--increasingly an 
everyday experience for even the wealthiest of enterprises.  In either case, the 
employee is similarly situated and unaffected, except for the possible 
discontinuation of his or her employment, by the success or failure of the 
enterprise.   
 
Assume that Corporation C and Partnership K both produce $1,000,000 in net 
profit annually.  Enter highly-paid executives Charlotte and Bob.  Charlotte is 
hired by Corporation C and Bob by Partnership K.  Both enterprises anticipate 
that the participation of these top executives in management will generate 
sizeable additional profits of $2,000,000, resulting in a net profit of $3,000,000, 
through the purchase/expenditure of the executives’ human capital.  Accordingly, 
each enterprise agrees to an annual salary of $200,000.  Both enterprises 
experience a 180 percent increase (from $1,000,000 to $2,800,00017) in net 
profits after taking the salaries of Charlotte and Bob into account. 
 
Charlotte and Bob derive a financial return on the expenditure of his or her 
human capital in the amount of $200,000.  Under the current tax law, each will be 
taxed annually on the compensation.18  The tax law characterizes such receipts 
as ordinary income.  The compensation is not entitled to preferential treatment 
under the Code and is taxed at the progressive rates.  It is assumed that the 
need for survival (food, housing, and other personal needs) affords sufficient 
motivation for such recipients to find the economic means through which to 
provide for their support.  Preferential tax rates theoretically are reserved for 
motivational purposes in settings where taxpayers might not otherwise invest.  
 
Accordingly, under current law, compensation, if taxed at the highest rate 
currently in force, will carry a maximum rate of 35 percent.  Thus, highly-paid 
executives receiving an annual salary will not be able to defer its receipt to 
another year or convert its characterization to preferentially treated capital gain.  
Importantly, after taxes, Charlotte and Bob each will retain $130,000 to spend or 
invest as they like.   
 
Possibly of greater importance, their earnings from the first year are not at risk 
regardless of the success of their respective enterprises in the future.  They are 
immune from forces in the marketplace involving their employment and their 
                                            
17 While the income generated by the enterprise through Charlotte’s and Bob’s expenditure of 
human capital increases from $1,000,000 to $3,000,000, expenses increase by the $200,000 
salary payment.  Thus, the net increase to the enterprise is $2,800,000 ($3,000,000 - $200,000). 
 
18 IRC § 61(a)(1) (2008). 
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expenditure of human capital.  While job retention may be a consideration, there 
is little or no uncertainty as to their overall economic enhancement for the year. 
 
Too often, critics assume that all compensatory relationships are similar, without 
meaningful distinction and that the employee baseline should govern the 
analysis.  In their view, the only issues to be addressed are whether the income 
must be taken into account currently or in the future and whether it generates 
ordinary income or preferentially treated capital gain upon receipt.  Infrequently 
do they accord any significance to the existence of risk or the failure to withdraw 
“foregone” salary.  Given their baseline of employee status, they limit their focus 
to the tax treatment upon receipt of the equity interest and ignore the tax 
consequences thereafter of the ownership of the equity interest during the 
operational and dispositional phases of the investment.  
 
However, a fundamental distinction exists between employee compensation and 
equity compensation.19  In equity ownership contexts, the economic 
enhancement, i.e., what the service provider otherwise would have extracted 
from the enterprise had he or she been paid, remains with the enterprise.  By 
contrast, in the employee setting, the economic enhancement (the salary) of the 
service provider exits the enterprise.  Thus, the issue arises as to whether that 
retention by the enterprise attributable to the service provider’s investment of 
human capital converts the characterization of the recipients’ return in whole or in 
part to invested capital.  If so, this would permit the return to be deferred until a 
realization event and to be taxed preferentially.   
 
In the equity ownership context, the elements of risk and uncertainty enter the 
equation, which further distinguishes the situation from that of the employee.20 
As a consequence, the utilization of the tax consequences of a pure employe
setting for purposes of comparison with compensatory transfers of equity 
interests is not identical and thus, is imprecise, at a minimum, and possibly 
irrelevant.
e 
                                           
21  
 
19 Employee compensation can be viewed as the expenditure of human capital, while equity 
compensation involves the investment of human capital. 
 
20 See also Senate Comm. On Finance, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, S. 
Prt. No. 169 at 227-28 (Comm. Print 1984) (explaining that partners, unlike non-partner third 
parties (such as employees), “extract the profits of the partnership with reference to the business 
success of the venture,” while employees “generally receive payments which are not subject to 
this risk”). 
 
21 In assessing the variations in compensatory arrangements, settings arise in which the 
employee and the enterprise possess a closer relationship than third parties and yet the nature of 
the compensatory arrangement is closer to that of a pure employee.  A service provider may 
possess an ownership interest in the enterprise through a prior contribution of capital in return for 
the proprietary interest. In both Subchapter C and Subchapter K, notwithstanding such 
ownership, third-party treatment is permitted if the investor is employed by the enterprise to 
render services. 
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B. Receipt of a Compensatory Interest in the Equity of an 
Enterprise by the Service Provider 
 
Continuing across the continuum of compensatory receipts in a business 
enterprise, we encounter settings in which the service provider does not have a 
pre-existing or concurrent investment in the enterprise and transacts exclusively 
for an equity interest therein in return for the rendition of services.  Receiving an 
entrepreneurial stake in the enterprise rather than a pure salary makes the issue 
of the tax treatment of the return on invested human capital more complex.   
 
An initial distinction with the pure employee model is that the equity interest 
transaction involves a payment in kind rather than in cash.  Nevertheless, the 
equity recipient service provider may possess immediate rights to realize upon 
his or her entrepreneurial investment by liquidation or sale of the interest.  
Alternatively, the economic ownership of the interest may be conditional and 
subject to restrictions.  If no limitations are imposed on the full ownership and 
transferability of the equity interest, i.e., the recipient’s ownership is vested, two 
questions are confronted.  Is there a current taxable event on that receipt, and to 
what extent are future financial returns from its ownership attributable to human 
capital or invested capital? 
 
In our example, if the service provider withdraws from the enterprise on the day 
of receipt, he or she would receive the value of his or her interest, which we will 
assume to be $500,000.  The tax issue under current law is simple as the 
transaction is closed.  Money in hand, there would be no reason to defer taxation 
on the receipt, which would be characterized as ordinary income derived from the 
anticipated investment of human capital. 
 
The setting becomes only slightly more problematic where the service provider’s 
equity interest is vested with regard to the ownership of his equity interest, and 
the service provider continues to provide services to the enterprise.  Under the 
tax law, in-kind receipts are subject to tax upon receipt with the recognized 
                                                                                                                                  
In the partnership context, this issue begins to strain the pure employee model. See generally 
Willis et. al., supra note 12, at ch. 11.   In contrast to the corporate context where the enterprise is 
taxed separately, a partnership for tax purposes is a conduit, with the income taxed but once to 
the partners.  While the income is determined in large part utilizing an entity approach, once 
determined, it is imputed to its members.   
 
Thus, a payment by a partnership to a partner could be viewed as the rendition of services to 
oneself with respect to his or her interest in the partnership and the remainder of the efforts on 
behalf of his or her partners.  Congress legislatively addressed the issue by specifying third-party 
treatment, which results in the full payment constituting income to the recipient which is offset by 
the provider’s share of the deduction available to the partnership.  The net result is that he or she 
is viewed as receiving the payment in part from himself or herself and the remainder from the 




difficultly of valuation.  That difficulty in our example is easily overcome because 
we have stipulated its worth to be $500,000.22  Thus, gross income of $500,000, 
characterized as ordinary income, arises upon the service provider’s receipt of 
the equity interest. 
 
Unfortunately, critics conclude that the treatment of this receipt sets the proper 
standard for the taxation of the entire return from the receipt of an equity interest 
and that any and all additional receipts from its ownership should be treated as 
derived from the expenditure of human capital rather than its investment.  In the 
example, services continue to be rendered to the enterprise and the return on 
those efforts almost without exception is not fully measured by the value of the 
equity interest on the date of receipt.  Issues are confronted as to how the further 
return on the receipt attributable to the service provider’s efforts during the 
operational and dispositional phase of the ownership is to be treated from a tax 
policy standpoint.  Under the Code, that return frequently receives preferential 
treatment akin to that accorded the return on invested capital.   
 
The service provider must be convinced that the ultimate return on the receipt of 
equity will be greater than the present value of a pure salary every year or else 
he or she would not accept the equity interest.  Thus, future appreciation in the 
value of the enterprise may be a part of the return from the investment of human 
capital.  If so, consistency in their criticism of the current tax treatment for such 
receipts would require ordinary income treatment regardless of the timing of the 
return because the service provider has contributed only services to the 
enterprise.23  However, seldom is the analysis extended to its logical conclusion. 
 
The service provider’s willingness to render future services without additional 
direct recompense results in an increase in the overall assets of the enterprise.  
The salary expense which otherwise would have been incurred is no longer a 
drain on the corporate or partnership coffers.  In the example, a full $200,000, 
which otherwise would have been expended by the enterprise, remains for its 
use and investment.  Thus, future appreciation, if any, in the value of the 
                                            
22 It is recognized that the value of a compensatory partnership interest may differ from that of 
compensatory stock in identically-situated enterprises, because the partnership interest is valued 
generally on its liquidation value while the worth of the corporate stock takes other factors into 
account.  The primary reason for such a distinction is that the partnership interest will impose 
additional annual tax consequences upon the holder under § 702(a) which does not occur in the 
corporate context.  Thus, the use of liquidation value acts as a means of avoiding double taxation. 
 
23 See, e.g., Mark Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service Partners, 48 Tax L. 
Rev. 69 (1992); The Levin Proposal, H.R. 2834 (100th Cong., 1st Sess), introduced by 
Representative Sander Levin on June 22, 2007; Aviva Aron-Dine, Center on Budget and Policy 




enterprise to some extent may be attributable to the invested return of the 
retained amounts attributable to the receipt of human capital.24  
 
At this point, however, only the current tax treatment of such receipts is being 
considered.  The goal in this portion of the Article is to illustrate the inaccuracy of 
the charge that compensatory transfers of partnerships profits interests are 
treated more favorably than other compensatory equity transfers.  Later in the 
discussion, the issue of whether improvements to the Code are necessary will be 
addressed.   
 
It is important to understand that the tax law currently fashions a compromise, 
frequently treating the overall return on a compensatory transfer of an equity 
interest as neither exclusively one on human capital nor one on invested capital.  
As we shall see, the current treatment of compensatory transfers comforts itself 
with a solution possessing the wisdom of Solomon by treating the taxable 
amount on receipt of the equity interest as attributable to human capital and 
amounts received thereafter frequently as a return on invested capital.  
Regardless of whether this is ideal, an issue explored below, current law permits 
it.  To alter that treatment solely for the receipt of profits interests in a partnership 
would discriminate against such receipts. 
 
III. The Difficulties in Measuring the Return on Human Capital 
 
Much of the difficulty in this area stems from the failure to define what constitutes 
a return on human capital in the equity context.  Some assume that if an equity 
transfer involves the rendition of services, ordinary income taxed at progressive 
rates is appropriate for the entire return from its ownership.25  However, while 
their target is the tax treatment of compensatory profits interests in a partnership, 
had they addressed other equity receipts, e.g., the receipt of corporate stock, 
they would have had to reconcile their advocacy with the bifurcated treatment 
under current law requiring ordinary income on the receipt of the interest yet 
permitting preferential treatment of the gain upon its disposition.   
 
In other contexts under the current tax law, the investment of human capital in 
return for an equity interest in an enterprise does not generate ordinary income.  
In fact, such results frequently are the exception, not the rule.  Thus, with respect 
to a consideration of both the current tax treatment of compensatory equity 
receipts and the normative treatment which an improved system would employ, a 
                                            
24 The transaction could be conceptualized as the enterprise transferring $500,000 in cash to the 
service provider as taxable compensation which is then contributed to the enterprise for an 
ownership interest.  Of course, the service provider would still need to procure additional funds 
with which to pay the tax owing of $175,000 (35% x $500,000). 
 
25 See references at note 23 supra. 
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definitional issue is confronted.  When is a financial return to a service provider 
from a business enterprise attributable to the rendition of services and when is it 
attributable to invested capital?  
 
Returning to our hypothetical, let us assume that Charlotte and Bob receive an 
equity interest in their respective enterprises.  In return for the equity interest, 
each is willing to assume greater risk for the possibility of a greater return.  
Comparing their settings to that of their pure employee counterparts, he and she 
are willing to forego an annual salary of $200,000 in return for a 20 percent 
equity interest in the enterprise.   
 
Important to the comparison and the analysis is that Charlotte and Bob forego 
their annual salary of $200,000.  Thus, the enterprise now derives annual income 
of $3,000,000, of which Charlotte and Bob are entitled to 20 percent, rather than 
the $2,800,000 of net income when they were mere employees.  From a pure 
economic standpoint, each has increased their economic annual return by 20 
percent of the annual income (whatever that may be) derived by the enterprise 
over what their salary otherwise would have been.  In this case, the economic 
increase is $400,000 (20% x $3,000,000 = $600,000 - $200,000). 
 
In isolating the human capital component, one approach is a determination 
focused upon the cost of procuring that human capital in the pure employee 
context, i.e., at a minimum, the service provider should have $200,000 of 
ordinary income per year.  He or she continues to render services during the 
coming years.  However, the future return will also be through appreciation, if 
any, in the worth of the enterprise in which they now possess an equity interest. 
Under such an approach, the compensatory equity interest holder would be 
taxed on $200,000 of ordinary income annually.  
 
A variation on this approach would be the postponement of the realization of the 
return on human capital until actual receipt, by distribution or from the sale or 
liquidation of the interest, of cash or property with the amount received 
attributable first to a return on human capital over the period during which 
services were rendered.  The remainder, if any, would be viewed as a return on 
invested capital.  In our example, if the service provider rendered services for 
four years and then sold or liquidated the interest for $2,700,000, the first 
$800,000 ($200,000 per year times four years) under this approach would be 
ordinary income and the remainder capital gain.  
 
Another approach would be to treat everything received from the ownership of 
the equity interest as constituting a return on human capital taxed at progressive 
rates.  Whether a current or liquidating distribution, any and all returns would be 
ordinary income because the totality of his or her “contribution” to the enterprise 
was of services only.  The parties transacted for the rendition of services, and 
thus any return derives from the expenditure of human capital.  Using the 
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example, if the interest were sold for $2,700,000, ordinary income in that amount 
would arise. 
 
Another variation from which to choose would be the determination of the return 
on human capital at the time of the receipt of the interest, based on its current 
value. Everything thereafter in excess of that amount would be treated as 
attributable to invested capital and taxed preferentially.  Thus, if the interest were 
worth $500,000 upon the grant, it would be taxed upon receipt as ordinary 
income and the recipient thereafter would be entitled to capital gain, regardless 
of the nature of the activities of the enterprise.26  
 
Some of these variations are premised on the assumption that the return on 
human capital is determined exclusively by the rendition of services.  Others 
accord significance to the fact that the funds which the service provider would 
have otherwise extracted from the enterprise have instead remained/were re-
invested in the enterprise.27  To what extent, if any, should an approach 
acknowledge that future appreciation in the enterprise may be attributable to the 
extra amounts now available to the enterprise for investment and use in the 
ongoing business activities?28   
 
The purpose of the above discussion is to illustrate the range of the possible tax 
treatments of the return from the investment of human capital in return for an 
equity interest in an enterprise.  More importantly, before one can assail the 
particular tax treatment of a compensatory receipt of an equity interest as 
aberrational, the contours of the guidelines for making the determination of what 
                                            
26 Current law is identical to this variation in the corporate context, but the treatment of the 
additional return in the partnership context turns on the nature of the profits generated by the 
enterprise.  If the partnership generates business income from its daily operations, the entirety of 
the excess over the initial value would be taxed at the progressive rates and would be included in 
income on an annual basis. 
 
27 Cf. IRC § 704(e) in the family partnership context. 
 
28 If the tax treatment is premised on the assumption that the future return from ownership is 
attributable to the invested capital which the service provider has committed to the enterprise by 
leaving his return on human capital for the use of the enterprise, different results ensue.  Failing 
to withdraw compensation from the enterprise has economic significance and arguably converts 
the investment from one of human capital to one of invested capital.    
 
Other variations are possible, including a bifurcated approach in the year of receipt.  For example, 
$130,000 could be attributable to human capital, i.e., the after tax amount in the pure employee 
setting, and the remainder ($70,000 of tax owing) attributable to invested capital.  In contrast to 
the pure employee setting in which he or she has the cash (most likely, it has been withheld by 
the employer and paid directly to the Service), the service provider has received only an 
ownership interest in an enterprise.  Utilizing these ratios, taxation could be postponed until 
realization and, similar to the tax treatment for installment sales, 65 percent would be attributable 
to the rendition of services and taxed accordingly at ordinary rates, while the remaining 35 
percent would be a return on invested capital and taxed preferentially.   
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constitutes a return on human capital must be specified. To date, critics have 
generally avoided the issue.29   
 
Regardless of whether the issue of how to treat the overall return on the 
compensatory receipt of an equity interest generates unanimity of opinion as to 
its determination and treatment from a tax policy standpoint, the above 
discussion illustrates that a number of differing approaches have some logical 
basis for their adoption.  The purity and simplicity of the employee setting has 
been replaced with complexity in the compensatory equity interest setting.  The 
latter category involves the difficulty of disentangling the mixture of contributed 
human capital and the re-investment of the return as invested capital.   
 
Notwithstanding this range of possibilities and the normative arguments which 
can be advanced regarding the improvement of the current treatment by the 
adoption of any of the approaches, the current approach under the Code is to 
value the property interest upon its receipt by the service provider and treat only 
that amount as a return on human capital in the year of receipt.  Any additional 
return is considered as attributable to invested capital.  Thus, the $500,000 worth 
of an equity interest in the examples above is ordinary income in Year 1, 
resulting in a basis of an equal amount to the service provider for his 
“investment.”  Any amount received thereafter (whether operational or 
dispositional) frequently is a return on invested capital.30 Thus, under current law, 
the initial receipt caps the return on human capital, and much of the future return 
is treated as flowing from invested capital.  
 
At a minimum, try as one may, the two settings, pure employee rendering 
services for cash and service provider rendering services for an equity interest in 
the enterprise, are not comparable.  Significant distinctions exist with respect to 
the degree of risk, time of ownership, and types of return.  The ownership of 
stock in a corporation or a capital interest in a partnership permits a second 
possible stream of an ongoing economic return, i.e., dividends with respect to the 
stock and profits with respect to the capital interest, as well as gain upon 
disposition of the interests.31  Accordingly, the tendency to utilize the pure 
                                            
29 See Fleischer, supra, note 2. 
 
30 This treatment does not guaranty preferential treatment in the partnership context due to the 
presence of § 702(b) which characterizes the income by the activities of the enterprise and 
imputes that characterization to all regardless of whether the partner contributed invested capital 
or human capital.  However, preferential treatment is assured in the corporate context.  
Importantly, in the partnership context, it is possible to derive ordinary income or capital gain 
during the operational and/or dispositional phase of the equity ownership, regardless of whether 
the partner is a service provider or a capital investor. 
 
31 I fully recognize, and emphasize in the text, that loss is a possibility.  Nevertheless, to achieve 
an economy of verbiage and to illustrate general misconceptions, except where necessary, I will 




employee setting as the basis for comparison is inappropriate.  Instead, the 
treatment of a compensatory transfer of a profits interest in a partnership should 
be compared with the results of compensatory transfers of other equity interests 
in business enterprises. 
A. Unrestricted Equity Interests in Corporations or 
Partnerships—Treatment in Year of Receipt 
 
In this variation, the compensatory grant to the service provider of stock in a 
corporation or a capital interest in a partnership is assumed to be without 
restriction or conditions.  Thus, Charlotte and Bob receive entrepreneurial 
interests without conditions, e.g., a four-year period of service before the interest 
vests.  Under the current tax law, unrestricted transfers of equity interests differ 
dramatically from restricted transfers with regard to risk, time of vesting, and 
economic significance.  Accordingly, such differences under current law justify 
differing tax treatment.   
 
An unrestricted ownership interest permits the recipient to exit the enterprise 
without penalty, e.g., one week later, should he or she decide to move in a 
“different direction” and seek an affiliation with another enterprise.  Because the 
equity interest vested upon receipt, Charlotte or Bob possess the right to 
terminate the relationship with Corporation C or Partnership K at any time.  Given 
the nature of their economic bargain with the enterprise, they are entitled to free 
and clear ownership of their equity interest.  Upon their exit, they have a glorious 
windfall--$500,000 in hand, receiving virtually “something for nothing” as they 
worked but a fraction of their expected, albeit not required, tenure.   
 
The enterprises will never receive the benefits of their labor, and Charlotte and 
Bob will have derived an economic windfall.  Even the classification of their 
receipts in tax policy terms is difficult because they never rendered significant 
services to the enterprises.  Is this a return on human capital, invested capital, or 
a third category of a pure windfall?  At a minimum, this component of the overall 
economic bargain documents the complexity in attempting to draw consistent 
lines in the treatment of the receipt of compensatory equity interests from the 
standpoint of sound tax policy principles. 
 
The tax treatment of such receipts is settled under current law and, in the year of 
receipt, closely approximates the tax treatment of the pure employee.  Charlotte 
and Bob both have ordinary income in the amount of $500,000 taxed at a rate of 
35 percent.32  Under existing Regulations, Charlotte and Bob both receive a 
                                            
32 Some suggest that the deduction available to the enterprise is important to the analysis.  See 
Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell Engler, The Carried Interest Controversy: Let’s Not Get Carried 
Away, 61 Tax L. Rev. 121 (2008) (allowing an interest deduction); Fleischer, supra note 2, at n.56 
(denying an interest deduction); Leo L. Schmolka, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for 
Services: Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 Tax L. Rev. 287, 312 n. 105 (1991) (also 
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basis in the enterprise of $500,000, which at a minimum gives the appearance 
that a conversion from human capital to invested capital occurs.33  As we will 
see, gain on the subsequent sale or liquidation of the interest is treated as a 
return on invested capital and taxed preferentially even though the grant was for 
the rendition of services.34   
 
Critics suggest that a compensatory receipt of an equity interest produces the 
same results as those generated in the pure employee context.35  They content 
themselves with an assessment of the tax treatment of the initial receipt of the 
equity interest; in our example, each has $500,000 of ordinary income.  However, 
if the quest is for the proper tax treatment of the return on human capital, then a 
more thorough inspection of the totality of the ownership period is required.  By 
doing so, one discovers that significant distinctions exist between the employee 
and the equity setting. 
 
Due to their in-kind receipt, Charlotte and Bob have a tax obligation on the value 
of their economic enhancement, which requires the use of funds from other 
sources in order to meet their tax liabilities.  More importantly, they are not 
similarly situated to their employee counterparts, because future appreciation in 
the value of the enterprise as well as potential earnings from its operations may 
inure to their benefit during the ownership period.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
denying an interest deduction).  However, for purposes of my analysis, I have chosen to avoid 
that aspect of compensatory transfers of equity interests. 
 
33 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-2 (d) and 1.83-2(a). 
 
34 Critics take as a given the similarity in treatment of the tax consequences of the receipt of a 
compensatory interest in equity, regardless of whether it is in a corporation or a partnership.  
However, such is not the case.  In the corporate context, once the receipt is taken into account, 
everything thereafter is taxed preferentially if the holding period requirement of more than one 
year has been met.  Future dividends from the enterprise and gain on the sale of the stock are 
treated preferentially.  I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2008) (dividends taxed at long-term capital gain rate for 
individuals); I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222 (defining capital asset and specifying holding period threshold 
for long-term and short-term capital gain or loss).    
 
In the partnership setting, such treatment will not arise in every case.  The return on a partnership 
interest is annual as each member must report his share of the partnership’s operations for the 
business year.  I.R.C. § 706(a) (2008).  Additionally, upon the sale or liquidation of the interest, an 
aggregate “look-through” approach which focuses on the nature of the assets held by the 
partnership comes into play.  I.R.C. §§ 741, 751(a) (2008) (gain or loss recognized on the sale of 
an interest in a partnership treated as attributable to the sale of a capital asset, except to the 
extent that it reflects gain or loss in the ordinary income assets of the partnership).  In contrast to 
the corporate model utilizing an entity approach and thus generating capital gain, the partnership 
model is capable of producing ordinary income on the sale or liquidation of the interest.  I.R.C.  
§ 751(a) (2008). 
 
35 See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3-4.  Cf. Schmolka, supra note 3 at 105 (suggesting the taxation 
of carried interest be modeled after Subchapter S). 
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An analysis which limits its tax policy comparisons to the first year only is 
incomplete.  More is required.  Charlotte and Bob receive their economic 
interests in return for an obligation to continue rendering services into the future.  
Assuming that they do so annually, without additional recompense and without 
the payment of dividends or the derivation of additional profits, future 
appreciation or depreciation may occur in the value of the enterprise.  Given their 
equity ownership, they will share in the success or failure of the enterprises.   
 
Critics fail to distinguish between the tax consequences of the receipt of 
unrestricted corporate stock and those derived from the receipt of an unrestricted 
capital interest in a partnership.  The tax consequences diverge dramatically 
depending upon which interest the service provider receives.   
 
The ownership interest in a corporation and one in a partnership are 
fundamentally and philosophically different.36  I have previously complained of 
the increasing tendency to conflate Subchapter K with Subchapter C.37  Too 
frequently, commentators assert that consistent treatment must arise in both 
areas.  They apparently assume that the Subchapter C treatment for a particular 
transaction is the same as that which arises under Subchapter K, which is not the 
case.  Instead, in many areas, significant differences between the two exist.   
 
Regarding the current taxation of operational earnings, these fundamental 
differences are evidenced by the governance of the entity approach for 
corporations and the aggregate/conduit approach for partnerships.  The service 
provider in the partnership setting, in contrast to his or her counterpart in the 
corporate context, has additional tax consequences on an annual basis.  In the 
corporate context, without the payment of dividends, no additional tax 
consequences will take place on an annual basis during the operational phase of 
the equity ownership.38 
 
Returning to the example and comparing the treatment accorded Charlotte and 
Bob, their treatment begins to diverge by the end of the first year.  Charlotte has 
$500,000 of ordinary income in Year 1 and an attendant basis of an equivalent 
amount for the stock.  Unless dividends are paid, she will have no further tax 
consequences until the sale or redemption of the stock.  All amounts in excess of 
her basis of $500,000 will be entitled to preferential tax treatment.  Earnings of 
the corporation will be subject to a first level of tax and Charlotte will have a 
second level imposed upon her. 
 
                                            
36 Compare Willis et. al., supra note 12 at ch 9 with Bittker and Eustice, supra note 15. 
 
37 See Philip F. Postlewaite, The Transmogrification of Subchapter K, 83 Taxes Magazine—The 
University of Chicago Tax Conference 189 (2005). 
 
38 In the interest of simplicity, the paper does not address these issues in the S corporation 
context. 
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Bob receives very different treatment after the receipt of his equity interest in the 
partnership.  While he too has $500,000 of ordinary income and an equivalent 
basis for his partnership interest, he also has a profits interest in the partnership.  
If he received a capital interest equal to 20 percent of the partnership’s capital, 
most likely he received an equivalent interest in profits and losses.  While 
flexibility is the hallmark of partnership taxation and the parties can agree to 
variations in which the percentage interest in profits of a partner can exceed his 
interest in capital, for purposes of illustration, we will assume that the percentage 
interests for Bob in profits, capital, and losses of the partnership are 20 percent.  
Accordingly, at year end, under § 702, he will include 20 percent of the 
partnership’s income for the year on his personal return and pay tax on that 
income as characterized at the partnership level. 
 
Assuming the partnership is earning $3,000,000 per year, per the example 
above, Bob will report annually 20 percent of that amount, i.e., $600,000, as 
additional income under § 702(a).  Furthermore, the income will be characterized 
at the partnership level pursuant to the legislative instruction of § 702(b).  Thus, 
depending upon the character of the income to the partnership, Bob’s 20 percent 
share of the income could range from exclusively ordinary income to exclusively 
long-term capital gain to any combination in between dependent upon the 
activities of the partnership.  In our example, Bob would report the $600,000 as 
ordinary income annually. 
 
Importantly, notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, the service provider in the 
partnership context, Bob reporting $600,000 of income annually (his 20 percent 
share in profits), is treated differently than his counterpart in the corporate 
context, where Charlotte is reporting $0 annually.  Neither party will report the 
same amount of income over the life of their equity ownership in the enterprise.  
Furthermore, Charlotte indirectly will bear her share of the corporate tax, 34 
percent of the $3,000,000, on an annual basis, since her amount realized on the 
sale or liquidation of the stock will reflect the reduction in the amount of corporate 
assets due to the payment of its tax obligations.   
 
Additionally, Charlotte will report the amount received on liquidation or sale, to 
the extent it exceeds the basis for the stock of $500,000, exclusively as long-term 
capital gain.  Bob, reporting the same $500,000 in Year 1, will report $600,000 
annually, as ordinary income or capital gain depending upon the character of the 
income to the partnership, which will increase his basis for his partnership 
interest.  The sale or liquidation proceeds less the increased basis will be taxed 
at the same time as Charlotte’s, but in contrast to Charlotte, it is far from certain 
that the entirety of any gain will receive preferential treatment.  The aggregate-
entity approach of Subchapter K possesses additional safeguards through § 751 
to prevent the conversion of ordinary income into capital gain which no longer 
exist in Subchapter C.39 
                                            




Of critical importance, as illustrated above, the settings are not similar.  
Corporations and partnerships function differently for tax purposes, and the dual- 
level of taxation attendant to the corporate enterprise differs dramatically from the 
single-level tax on an annual basis inherent in the treatment of partnerships.40  
They are fundamentally different,41 which is why direct comparisons between the 
two for a “snapshot” period of their existence are misleading.   
 
In summary, assume that Charlotte and Bob received their interests, valued at 
$500,000 at the close of business on December 31, Year 1.  They each spend 
the next four years with their respective enterprises before selling their interests 
on December 31, Year 5.  During each of those years, the enterprises earned 
$3,000,000.  When Charlotte and Bob received their 20 percent equity interests, 
they were worth $500,000, which resulted in $500,000 of ordinary income to 
each. 42  
 
As noted above, Bob reports $600,000 annually as his share of the profits and 
under Subchapter K adjusts his basis in order to ensure that he is not taxed twice 
on the same income.  At the end of the ownership period, he sells his interest for 
$2,900,000, assuming no unrealized appreciation of assets, and reports no 
additional gain.43  Thus, in the partnership setting, in addition to the $500,000 of 
ordinary income upon receipt, Bob has reported income annually (even though 
there have been no distributions made to him), without the benefit of deferral, 
and, depending upon the activities of the partnership over this four-year period, 
characterized either as ordinary or capital.   
 
                                            
40 See Postlewaite, supra note 37, complaining of efforts to ignore the fundamental differences 
between Subchapter K and Subchapter C. 
 
41 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 5, 10, & 18 (drawing direct comparisons between 
partnerships and corporations and calling for consistency between the two forms).   
 
42 The corporate interest was anticipated to be less profitable than actually occurred.  
Accordingly, the value on receipt equaled the value of the partnership taking into account various 
factors in addition to liquidation value.  Thereafter, to Charlotte’s good fortune, the corporation 
proved to be more profitable than anticipated. 
 
43 The examples are simplified for purposes of comparison and differ dramatically from the real 
world.  Constant earnings are assumed over a four-year period in a world without inflation.  
Furthermore, the assets of the enterprise are assumed to stay constant in value without 
appreciation or depreciation.  All of these factors are confronted in the conduct of real world 
business operations.  One could integrate further assumptions into the examples in order to 
comport with the real world.  However, the general tax consequences illustrated by the examples 
would not change. 
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Government statistics suggest that approximately 3,000,000 tax returns are filed 
by partnerships annually. 44  Most likely, a 20 percent equity interest in a majority 
of those enterprises would produce a sizeable amount of ordinary income 
annually, particularly in business, as opposed to investment, enterprises such as 
law and accounting firms.   
 
Given the fundamental difference between the taxation of corporations and 
partnerships, Charlotte’s results differ from Bob’s.  While reporting an equivalent 
amount of ordinary income in Year 1, she reports nothing for the next four years.  
Her basis for her corporate stock is $500,000.  Her sales price for her interest 
would be $2,084,000 ($600,000 share of annual earnings less corporate tax at 
34 percent rate of $204,000 times four years plus $500,000 value of initial 
receipt).  Charlotte would be taxed at preferential rates on $1,584,000 
($2,084,000 - $500,000) of gain.   
 
Thus, in total amounts taxed to each, Charlotte is taxed on $2,084,000 and Bob 
$2,900,000.  Of those amounts, the character of Charlotte’s is $500,000 ordinary 
and $1,584,000 as capital gain.  Bob’s is $2,900,000 as ordinary income.  Bob 
“derived” income annually over the full four-year period while Charlotte did not.  
Without time value considerations, Bob’s net income after taxes is $1,885,000 
($2,900,000 less taxes at a rate of 35 percent of $1,015,000).45  Charlotte’s is 
$1,631,400 ($2,084,000 less taxes of $412,600 ($500,000 at 35 percent, 
$175,000, and $1,584,000 at 15 percent, $237,600)). 
 
At a minimum, Charlotte and Bob clearly are not taxed similarly on the overall 
return from their investment of human capital.  Differences arise regarding when 
they are taxed, the character of the return and the rate at which it is taxed, and 
the impact of an entity level tax.  
B. Restricted Compensatory Transfers of Corporate Stock or 
Partnership Capital Interest—Year of Vesting 
      
The more likely scenario with regard to compensatory transfers of equity 
interests involves the imposition of various restrictions prior to the vesting of 
ownership in the service provider.  Fearing the consequences described above, 
i.e., the departure of the service provider with current rights to the equity of the 
enterprise without the rendition of the bargained for services, the more typical 
setting involves a transfer of the equity interest conditioned upon the completion 
                                            
44 For example, in 2006, 2.9 million partnership tax returns were filed. See Internal Revenue 
Service, Tax Facts at a Glance, available online at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=102886,00.html. 
 
45 If the income generated by the partnership had been long-term capital gain, Bob would have 
been taxed at a 15 percent rate on his annual income, thereby reducing the overall tax liability 
and increasing his net income after taxes to $2,265,000. 
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of a fixed period of service before vesting, e.g., four years.  Upon the fulfillment of 
the conditions, ownership of the interest is transferred to the service provider. 
 
The tax law has addressed the treatment of restricted compensatory transfers of 
equity interests in § 83.  Utilizing the fact patterns described above, i.e., the grant 
of a 20 percent interest in either corporate stock or partnership capital 
conditioned upon four years of service, which at the time of the grant was worth 
$500,000 without regard to the restriction, the tax consequences to the service 
provider are postponed.  The restrictions are such that the tax law does not 
equate such a receipt as true and complete current ownership of the equity 
interest.   
 
From a tax policy standpoint, this is a logical and sound approach.  The Supreme 
Court in Commissioner vs. Glenshaw Glass Co. held that “accessions to wealth, 
clearly realized, over which the taxpayer exercises complete dominion and 
control” constitute gross income.46  The tax law embraces the concept of 
realization.  If one does not currently possess all rights to ownership, income is 
generally deferred until a time at which the economic enhancement is clear and 
certain. 
 
The tax consequences of the transaction differ dramatically from those involving 
the transfer of unrestricted equity interests.  In the case of restricted transfers, at 
the time of the transfer, there is no certainty of vesting.  Actual ownership is 
dependent upon future events which are uncertain and subject to risk.  
Accordingly, postponing the tax consequences is logical, even though the value 
of the potential receipt is certain at the time of the grant, until the transaction 
equates with the compensatory transfer of an unrestricted interest.  Tax 
consequences should be suspended until the point in time at which the recipient 
has complete dominion and control over the equity interest.  At that time, he or 
she possesses the same ability to insist upon a share of the assets of the 
enterprise through sale or liquidation as does the recipient of an unrestricted 
equity interest. 
 
Under the Code,47 no tax consequences ensue for restricted equity transfers until 
the conditions have been fulfilled and the property vests (Year 4 in our example).  
Upon the completion of the service requirement, the service provider is taxable 
on the value of the stock or the partnership interest at that time.  As the transfer 
involved a 20 percent interest in the enterprise, that percentage of the overall 
valuation of the enterprise at the end of Year 4 is includable in the service 
provider’s income as ordinary income.  The 20 percent interest, which initially 
                                            
46 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1961). 
 
47 IRC § 83(a) (2008). 
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had a value of $500,000, has appreciated to a liquidation value of $2,900,000 if 
the enterprise is a partnership and a value of $2,084,000 if a corporation.48     
 
From a theoretical tax policy standpoint, the presence of the restriction generated 
a greater return on human capital, $2,900,000 or $2,084,000 rather than 
$500,000 in the case of unrestricted receipts.  Under the current tax law, the 
service providers would take a basis of $2,900,000 and $2,084,000 in the 
enterprise respectively upon vesting.  
 
Future appreciation in the value of the enterprise is considered to be a return on 
invested capital, even though Charlotte and Bob continue to render services to 
the enterprise.49  Had the critics extended their scrutiny of compensatory 
transfers of equity interests past the point of initial receipt, they might complain 
that human capital by such tax treatment is improperly being converted to 
investment capital because the service provider’s commitment to the enterprise 
has been nothing more than the rendition of services, i.e., the investment of 
human capital.50  However, they would also have to acknowledge that the 
conversion feature which they deem to be unacceptable in the profits interest 
context exists in other types of compensatory transfers of enterprise equity 
interests. 
 
Importantly, the overall results for Bob in the partnership context, if the 
partnership’s earnings are characterized as ordinary income, may be identical to 
the tax consequences which would have arisen if the compensatory transfer of 
the equity interest had been unrestricted.  The overall results for Charlotte, and 
                                            
48 As the enterprise earned $3,000,000 per year over four years, none of which was distributed, 
the overall appreciation totaled $12,000,000 in the partnership context.  Of that amount, a 20 
percent interest would be entitled to $2,400,000, which when combined with the initial valuation 
on the date of the grant of $500,000 would total $2,900,000.  In the corporate context, the value 
at the end of four years would be reduced by the amount of the corporate tax, resulting in a value 
of $2,084,000. 
 
Additional complexity arises due to the differences in valuing the receipt of a partnership interest 
and corporate stock.  Liquidation value typically controls in the partnership context while 
additional factors come into play in the corporate context.  While an integration of these factors 
could change the numbers of our examples, the general conclusions would be unaffected. 
 
Technically, the enterprise would be entitled to a deduction for the amount included in income 
(I.R.C. § 162(a) (2008)) which would alter the results somewhat in the corporate context by 
lessening the tax liability on the corporation and thereby increasing Charlotte’s share of the worth 
of the corporation.  In the interest of simplicity, this additional adjustment has been omitted.  In 
the partnership context, the deduction would be allocated to the other partners (I.R.C. § 83(h) 
(2008)) and thus Bob’s results should be unchanged. 
 
49 As noted above, in the partnership context, a return on invested capital does not always 
generate capital gain. 
 
50 We will return to consider the mischief caused by the § 83(b) election.  See infra at notes 190- 
194 and accompanying text. 
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Bob if the partnership annually derives long-term capital gain income, are 
dramatically worse in the restricted setting, because the entirety of the income 
received will be taxed as ordinary income at the rate of 35 percent, rather than 
the preferred rate of 15 percent.  Importantly, this analysis illustrates differing tax 
consequences for the same receipt due exclusively to its restricted status. 
C. Compensatory Receipts of Profits Interests in Partnerships   
  
Compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise differ in the corporate 
world of Subchapter C and the partnership world of Subchapter K.  In the 
corporate world, typically the enterprise can transfer an interest in stock only, 
whether common or preferred.51  It is generally not possible under the tax law to 
transfer rights to dividends of a corporation without transferring the stock.    
 
In the partnership context, the enterprise and its members are subject to a 
different taxing regime designed for the imposition of a single level of tax.  
Taxation takes place when income is derived by the enterprise and is taxed not 
to the enterprise but instead to the members, regardless of whether the income is 
distributed to them.  Furthermore, the characterization of the income earned by 
the partnership is determined at the partnership level without regard to the 
business activities of its partners and their degree of involvement in the conduct 
of the partnership’s operations.52   
 
Another facet of partnership taxation ignored by some is that capital interests are 
accompanied by profits interests regardless of whether the equity interest is 
acquired in return for capital contributions or in return for the rendition of 
services.  It is misleading to describe a service provider as receiving only a 
capital interest.  Without exception, a capital interest and a profits interest in the 
partnership is received by the service provider. 
 
However, it is also possible for a partnership to transfer an equity interest in 
profits only to the service provider.  The distinction between the receipt of a 
profits interest and that of a capital interest is that the latter has liquidation value 
at the time of receipt while the former does not.  As illustrated above, a profits 
interest is dependent upon the future successful conduct of the partnership’s 
business in order to produce an economic return to its holder.  Significantly, a 
capital interest has liquidation value upon receipt; a profits interest does not.    
 
Accordingly, a “pure” profits interest, i.e., one not tied to an interest in capital, is 
not taxed upon receipt.  The reason for this treatment is the difficulty in valuation, 
                                            
51 Income earned in the corporate context is potentially subject to an additional level of taxation.  
Dividend distributions or gain from the sale or liquidation of the stock will precipitate the 
imposition of another tax on the corporate earnings. 
 
52 I.R.C. § 702(b) (2008). 
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the lack of certainty that anything will be received, and the complexity arising 
from the potential for “double taxation,” i.e., once upon receipt followed by a 
second tax as earned.53  Arguably, such an interest is implicitly, if not explicitly, a 
restricted interest.  Only as services are rendered is the service provider entitled 
to the receipt of a share of the profits generated.   
 
Significantly, a profits interest at year end, if the profits are not withdrawn, 
transforms in the following year into an interest in capital as well as an interest in 
profits.  The prior year’s undistributed profits become an interest in partnership 
capital in Year 2.  Thus, most recipients of pure profits interests after the year of 
receipt also possess an interest in partnership capital. 
 
The Service in 1993 removed any doubt about the income inclusion and 
valuation issues of a compensatory transfer of a profits interest with its 
publication of Revenue Procedure 93-27.54  Therein, the Service held that the 
receipt of such an interest generally does not constitute a taxable event either for 
the partner or for the partnership.  Focusing upon the rights of such a service 
provider, if liquidation occurred the next day, he or she would be entitled to 
nothing.  The service provider would walk away from the partnership empty-
handed.  As a consequence, the Service concluded that there is no policy 
rationale for current taxation.55 
 
Using the same example as above but with Bob receiving only a 20 percent 
interest in profits, there are no tax consequences upon the receipt of the interest. 
Bob would report $600,000 of income per year for the four-year period, subject to 
either a 35 percent or a 15 percent rate of tax depending upon the character of 
the partnership’s income determined at the partnership level.  Significantly, the 
tax consequences for the compensatory receipt of the profits interest and the 
compensatory receipt of an unrestricted capital interest are identical in every 
respect except for the additional liquidation value of the interest to which the 
service provider is entitled on the date of receipt of a capital interest.  
 
                                            
53 As explained below, double taxation will never occur due to the built-in “homeostasis factor” 
inherent in Subchapter K.  See discussion infra at note 177.  However, time value and possible 
character distortions may attend taxation upon receipt. 
 
54 1993-2 C.B. 343. 
 
55 Three exceptions were provided in the release, each of which involves variations undercutting 
the underlying premise that the interest is uncertain of value.  Regulations have been proposed, 
accompanied by a proposed Revenue Procedure, to further embrace this treatment with an 
expansion of the present treatment as well as a consideration of particular problem areas 
regarding the forfeiture of a compensatory interest for which there was a lack of guidance.  See 
Prop. Treas. Reg. Preamble 5-24-2005 and Notice 2005-43. 
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Notwithstanding advocacy to the contrary,56 compensatory receipts of profits 
interests in a partnership are not treated more favorably than transfers of capital 
interests in a partnership under current tax law.57  Upon receipt, they are taxed 
on the basis of their current liquidation value, because all future economic to the 
interest will be taxed to the holder currently as realized by the partnership under 
Subchapter K.  After receipt, their treatment is identical.  
 
A receipt of a compensatory capital interest in a partnership possesses current 
liquidation value while a profits interest does not.  As the enterprise conducts 
business operations, both the holder of a compensatory capital interest and the 
holder of a compensatory profits interest will take their share of profits into 
account annually.  Furthermore, the future value of the profits to be generated by 
the partnership is not taken into account upon receipt of the interest due to the 
conduit treatment of the enterprise.  As illustrated above, both recipients will be 
taxed on the same amount of future earnings, at the same time, and at the same 
character.  The only difference in tax consequence will be the liquidation value of 
the initial receipt, which is attributable to something that the profits interest holder 
will never receive and thus upon which he or she should not be taxed.58   
  
D. Dispositional Return on Compensatory Transfers of Equity 
Interests 
 
An additional return may arise to the holder of a compensatory equity interest on 
its disposition through liquidation or sale.  In the case of a capital interest, once 
vested, any appreciation in the assets of the partnership will impact the value of 
the interest.  Depending upon the composition of the partnership assets, capital 
gain characterization is likely, but ordinary income is possible as well upon the 
disposition of the partnership interest.59  Importantly, under § 706(c) of the Code, 
the taxable year closes on the date that the interest is retired or sold.  The results 
                                            
56 Fleischer, supra note 2 at 12; Schmolka, supra note 3, at 289.  In the case of a restricted 
interest, the availability of a § 83(b) election results in the minimization of any difference between 
the receipt of a capital interest and a profits interest.    
 
57 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4:  “The conversion of labor income into capital gain is 
contrary to the general approach of the Internal Revenue Code and diverges from the treatment 
of other compensatory interests.  Partnership profits interests are treated more favorably than 
other economically similar methods of compensation, such as partnership capital interests, 
restricted stock, or at-the-money nonqualified stock options (the corporate equivalent of a 
partnership profits interest).” 
 
58 Significantly, many recipients of a restricted capital interest will receive similar treatment, 
because they will avail themselves of the § 83(b) election in order to minimize the ordinary 
income component upon receipt. 
 
59 IRC §§ 741, 751(a) (2008).  See generally Willis et. al., supra note 12, at chs. 12 and 14. 
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for the year are tallied and allocated to the exiting partner and may result in 
varying amounts of ordinary income and/or capital gain.  
 
In the corporate context, future appreciation in the value of the stock generates 
capital gain on the sale or liquidation of the stock, regardless of the nature of the 
underlying corporate assets.  Thus, a shareholder of a corporation with 
significant inventory which if sold by the corporation would generate ordinary 
income is entitled to capital gain on the sale of his or her stock.  The return 
generates preferential treatment even though the stock was issued exclusively in 
return for the rendition of services. 
E. Summary of the Current Tax Treatment of Compensatory 
Transfers of Equity Interests 
 
This brief overview of the tax law’s treatment of compensatory transfers of equity 
interests in an enterprise is an important prerequisite to an assessment of 
criticism regarding the current state of the law and its treatment of the transfer of 
compensatory equity interests.  As illustrated, there are five traditional types of 
equity interests which can be received in the future by a service provider 
exclusively in return for the rendition of services—corporate stock, restricted 
corporate stock, partnership capital interest, restricted partnership capital 
interest, and partnership profits interest.   
 
Under the current tax law, there are differences in the overall treatment between 
compensatory transfers of corporate equity interests and partnership equity 
interests.  Thus, the assumption that there is uniform tax treatment for the return 
on human capital through the receipt of equity interests in an enterprise is 
erroneous.  Importantly, the treatment of compensatory partnership profits 
interests is not a “quirk” and is not unique. 
 
An appreciation of the current tax treatment for the compensatory transfer of all 
five interests is essential in order to evaluate proposals for reform and 
improvement of the status quo.  Too frequently, the entirety of the events which 
constitute the return on the service provider’s investment of human capital is 
ignored.  Instead, the focus is limited to the tax consequences upon receipt.60  
Accordingly, many assumptions and assertions about the current state of the law 
are inaccurate and such criticism is premised on a faulty foundation. 
 
                                            
60  See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 10 (looking only to tax treatment upon receipt of the 
profits interest to conclude that current tax law is in this regard counterintuitive and inconsistent 
with treatment of other “equivalent” methods of compensation); Schmolka, supra note 3, 
(proposing proper tax treatment upon receipt based upon whether the service partner was acting 
in its capacity as partner in performance of the services). See generally Aron-Dine, supra note 23 
(treating receipt of a profits interest as comparable to receipt of any other type of compensation 
and decrying the perceived unfairness of taxation of the former at preferential rates).  
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To summarize, pure employee status results in a fixed and certain monetary 
receipt, taxed as ordinary income.61  With respect to compensatory equity 
interests in an enterprise, the current treatment under the tax law of such receipts 
is settled.   
 
In the corporate context, the entirety of the return to the service provider is never 
exclusively ordinary income.  Instead ordinary income is mandated for the receipt 
of the equity interest62 to the extent of its value and capital gain arises on its 
disposition.  Unless there is a payment of dividends, no other tax consequences 
are forthcoming during the interim.  Thus, under the current tax law, the entirety 
of the return on the investment of human capital is not taxed at progressive rates. 
 
In the partnership context, ordinary income to the extent of liquidation value is 
similarly derived upon receipt of an equity interest, ordinary income and/or capital 
gain arises annually during the ownership period dependent upon the operations 
of the enterprise, and ordinary income and/or capital gain is recognized upon its 
disposition dependent upon the nature of the assets held by the enterprise. 
Again, under the current tax law, the entirety of the return on the investment of 
human capital is not necessarily taxed at progressive rates.  In fact, post-
acquisition returns in the partnership context will more likely be taxed at 
progressive rates than in the corporate context.  However, current law does not 
mandate taxation of the entirety of the return at progressive rates. 
 
In keeping with the three-fold purpose of this Article, the goal has been initially to 
examine thoroughly the current state of the law and to illustrate that the issue of 
the return on human capital and return on invested capital, while clear upon the 
receipt of an equity ownership interest, becomes intertwined over the life of the 
ownership of the equity interest.  The two concepts meld together, and there is 
no effort to disentangle them after the receipt of the equity interest in the 
enterprise.   
                                            
61 Identical treatment is derived by service providers who possess an equity interest and 
negotiate with their enterprise on an arm’s length basis to receive a fixed and certain monetary 
amount for services provided to their enterprise.  They possess a dual relationship with their 
enterprise as both an equity interest holder and a service provider compensated directly for his or 
her labor. 
 
62 If the interest is restricted, the value is determined when the conditions are fulfilled and the 
ownership interest vests.  I.R.C. § 83(a) (2008).  An available election under § 83(b) is permitted 
through which the recipient can accelerate the tax consequences based on the value of the equity 
interest on the date of receipt.  I.R.C. § 83(b) (2008).  As will be discussed below, the election is 
indefensible from a tax policy standpoint and thus a discussion of its effects has been reserved 
until later. See infra notes 186 - 190 and accompanying text. 
 
 28
IV. Is the Receipt of a Profits Interest in a Private Equity Fund 
Inconsistent with the Current Tax Law?63 
 
Some have recently questioned the ability to compensate service providers with 
a profits interest in a partnership, particularly in the context of private equity 
funds, because, in their view, current law fails to tax the return on human capital 
at progressive rates.  They assert that the treatment of such interests under the 
current tax law deviates from the norm for other compensatory transfers of equity 
interests in an enterprise.  Criticizing the use of compensatory transfers of profits 
interests to unfairly minimize their tax burden, they posit an urgent need for 
reform.64  
 
Allegedly, equity fund managers are improperly permitted to take their share of 
the enterprise’s profits as “the equity portion of their compensation.”65  
Furthermore, the liberal tax rules for compensating service partners under 
Subchapter K create tax planning opportunities which are not available in other 
compensatory contexts.  These managers, through their willingness to accept 
profits, rather than capital, interests in the partnership, benefit from both the 
deferral of the payment of tax and the conversion of ordinary income into capital 
gain.66   
 
It is asserted that this “quirk in the tax law allows some of the richest workers in 
the country to pay tax on their labor income at a low rate.”67  Framed in this 
fashion, the passions of the public and Congress are aroused.68  However, by 
failing to survey the entirety of the tax consequences to the recipient of a 
compensatory transfer of an equity interest in an enterprise, these advocates 
mischaracterize the current tax treatment of such transfers.  As illustrated above, 
                                            
63 Some critics assert that their view is almost universally held by the academic community.  See 
Victor Fleischer,Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds 51 (U of 
Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-27, 2007), available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=892440:  (“[I]t’s  worth noting that there is (near) academic consensus on 
one issue:  the status quo treatment of a profits interest in a partnership is no longer a tenable 
position to take as a matter of sound tax policy.”).  
 
64 Vice President elect Biden would likely embrace such advocacy as it reflects his view of a 
patriotic duty to pay taxes at the highest rates. 
 
65 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3. 
 
66 I return to this point regularly; however, deferral and conversion are central to most 
compensatory transfers of equity interests.  Mistakenly, critics appear to ignore the risk factor in 
their analysis.  The fact that the recipient may never receive a return on his labor is discounted 




68 Id.  For a sample of reactions from the press and Congress, see supra note 6. 
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a fuller exploration of the tax consequences during the entirety of the service 
provider’s ownership of the equity interest reveals that the tax treatment of a 
profits interest is neither unique nor extraordinary.   
 
A fundamental misconception about the current tax law is that the investment of 
human capital under the Code generates ordinary income.  As illustrated, much 
of the return on compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise is 
taxed preferentially.  In fact, a profits interest in a partnership frequently 
generates ordinary income while an equity interest in a corporation, if profitable, 
invariably results in preferential capital gain.69  Thus, the assertion that the 
treatment of profits interest is inconsistent with other compensatory transfers of 
equity interests is mistaken. 
 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether a compensatory profits interest receives 
preferential treatment under current law, an additional issue arises as to whether 
the tax treatment of compensatory equity interests overall should be improved.  I 
return to this topic below.   
 
Some suggest “that reconsideration of the partnership profits puzzle is 
overdue,”70 and advance proposals, albeit narrowly fashioned, for reform. 
They arrive at this conclusion even though the issue of the proper taxation of the 
receipt of a partnership profits interest has received an inordinate amount of time 
and effort over the past 35 years by the courts, the Treasury, the Service, and 
numerous commentators.71   Nevertheless, it is alleged that the evolution of the 
law and its consideration by government officials, practitioners, jurists, and 
academics has fallen short of the mark.  
 
One of the difficulties with this recent academic commentary is that it fails to 
clarify its target.  Is its purpose to reform the treatment of compensatory transfers 
of all profits interests of any partnership or instead to address the issue only in 
the context of private equity firms and the activities of the mega rich?72  If the 
                                            
69 In both settings, it is assumed that the enterprise does not distribute cash or property prior to 




71 See Willis et. al., supra note 12 at ch 4.  See also supra notes 3-4 (containing academic 
commentary on the issue). 
 
72 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2.  Compare the author’s statements in his article regarding the 
tax treatment of profits interests (see e.g., pages 1, 4, 16, 20, 25, 49, 58, and 59) with those 
regarding the tax treatment of private equity firms (see, e.g., pages 1, 3, 6, 8, 17, 26, 35, 49, and 
53). See also Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 Tax L. Rev. 89 (2008).  The author appears 
conflicted in his determination of the ideal scope of reform. Targeting the mega rich creates the 
“unsatisfying impression” that these firms are “being punished simply for having too much 
money,” (Id. at 117) implying that the scope of such reform should be broad—perhaps applying to 
all partnerships. Yet, he also appeals to “the populist goal of preventing the concentration of 
wealth” as a rationale for eliminating the possibility of capital gains treatment for profits interests, 
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intent is to prevent excessive benefits for the super rich, thereby targeting 
investment structures solely on the size of the return, the goal must be 
questioned.  Changing major structural components of the tax treatment of 
partners and partnerships which have been in place for more than 50 years is ill-
advised if the reason for reform is the profitability of a single industry.   
 
However, if the concern is broader, i.e., the proper theoretical taxation of a 
compensatory receipt of a profits interest in a partnership, such concerns arise 
with respect to any receipt of a profits interest.  Reform, if needed, should be 
broadly-based, applicable to all.  A fundamental principle of tax policy is 
horizontal equity, i.e., similarly-situated individuals should be treated similarly.  
The net worth and/or net income of the recipient is irrelevant to the development 
of sound tax policy principles.  If the current treatment of compensatory profits 
interests is inappropriate for private equity firms, it is similarly so for all other 
business enterprises, regardless of size.  
 
Most, if not all, of the perceived problem was caused by the death of the Reagan 
revolution in the area of taxation.  During his presidency and with his leadership, 
the Code was reformed by effectively eliminating the rate preference for capital 
gains.  The disparity in the tax treatment of capital gain and ordinary income is 
central to these concerns.73  The proper taxation of human capital and invested 
capital would be a non-issue if preferential treatment for capital gains were 
eliminated from the Code.  Nevertheless, for purposes of our analysis, one must 
assume that the tax preference for capital gain income will continue into the 
foreseeable future.   
 
Critics argue that change is long overdue.  For example, recent commentary 
asserts:  “[T]he status quo is untenable as a matter of tax policy.”74  I argue to the 
contrary—the status quo is the second best approach to the issue.  Given the 
administrative difficulties in disentangling in any meaningful way the return on 
human capital and the return on invested capital, the current system is the best 
we can do.   
 
The current tax treatment of compensatory transfers of equity interests in 
enterprises did not occur by happenstance.  Instead the treatment is by 
                                                                                                                                  
(Id. at 118-19) suggesting that only a few privileged sectors should be reformed. On the one 
hand, he decries the Blackstone IPO for having less tax liability as a publicly traded partnership 
than it would have as a public corporation (Id. at 96); while, on the other hand, he applauds the 
Blackstone IPO for being accessible to the general investing public (Id. at 119).  
  
73 See Fleischer, supra note 64, at 96 (“Carried interest distributions are often taxed at the long-
term capital gains rate of 15%. Corporations, however, cannot take advantage of the capital gains 
preference; corporations pay tax on such gains at a 35% rate. So if Blackstone were treated as a 
corporation for tax purposes, it would pay substantially more tax on the compensation it earns for 
managing funds.”). 
 
74 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4. 
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Congressional design.  The tax consequences upon the receipt and ownership of 
a compensatory profits interest in a partnership are no different than the 
consequences of other compensatory transfers of partnership equity interests 
and in many cases are worse than the tax treatment of corporate compensatory 
transfers.  The tax treatment of profits interests is not unique.   
 
Critics have erroneously concluded that the taxation of compensatory profits 
interests differs dramatically from the taxation of other compensatory equity 
interests.  They assert that the adoption of various reform proposals would tax 
profits interests “in a manner that more closely matches how our tax system 
treats other forms of compensation, thereby improving economic efficiency and 
discouraging wasteful regulatory gamesmanship.” 75  However, our current 
system for taxing compensatory transfers of equity interests fails to treat the 
majority of the return thereon as attributable to the rendition of services, taxed at 
progressive rates.   
 
In most corporate cases, after receipt, virtually all of the remaining return on the 
investment of human capital receives capital gain treatment.  This treatment 
holds even though the service provider throughout the life of his relationship with 
the enterprise does nothing more than provide services.  Neither is this the case 
in the partnership context, either with respect to the transfer of compensatory 
capital interests or profits interests.  In fact, after receipt, in many cases, much of 
the return from a profits interest may be characterized as ordinary income, 
depending upon the business activities of the partnership.    
 
By limiting their focus to a single industry and by failing to look generally to the 
entire field of compensatory transfers of equity interests, they erroneously 
suggest that in most settings the return on human capital results in ordinary 
income.76  Furthermore, they mistakenly assert that profits interests in 
partnerships receive better tax treatment than that available for other 
compensatory transfers of equity in an enterprise. 
 
However, the general treatment of compensatory treatment of equity interests in 
an enterprise can be improved.  As will be discussed further below, I offer a 
modest proposal for reform, which would treat compensatory transfers of equity 
interests in a business enterprise consistently and would ensure that the return 
on human capital is taxed at ordinary rates at the appropriate time.  Current law 
                                            
75 Id at 2 (abstract). 
 
76 See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3 (implying that in most settings the return on human capital 
results in ordinary income) and 49 (asserting that profits interests in partnerships receive 
preferential tax treatment under current law); Cunningham & Engler, supra note 4 at 4 (return on 
human capital should result in ordinary income and profits interests receive preferential tax 
treatment under the status quo); Aron-Dine, supra note 20 at 1 (also assuming that returns on 




possesses an elective provision through which recipients of a restricted equity 
interest can elect to value it for tax purposes as of the date of receipt, i.e., prior to 
vesting.  This feature is one of the least defensible aspects of the current tax 
treatment of compensatory transfers of equity interests from the standpoint of tax 
policy. 
V. Private Equity Funds—Organization and Compensatory 
Treatment of Fund Managers 
 
The standard package for fund managers of a private equity fund is “two and 
twenty.”  The managers “take a share of partnership profits as the equity portion 
of their compensation.”77  They typically insist upon a management fee equal to 
two percent of the capital contributed to the enterprise by the other investors.78  
The two percent is generally assessed on committed capital, regardless of 
whether it has been contributed to date.  In addition, the fund manager, as its 
“upside potential,” receives a 20 percent interest in the future profits of the 
enterprise.   
 
If the fund does well, the manager shares in the bonanza.  If unsuccessful, the 
manager “can walk away.”79  Heads I win and tails you lose, the critics would 
have us believe.  Apparently, in their minds, the possibility of receiving nothing 
for one’s time and effort does not differentiate the relationship from other 
compensatory settings such as those of a pure employee or the unrestricted 
receipt of compensatory equity interests. 
 
The typical private investment fund is organized as a limited partnership or a 
limited liability company, the significance of which from a tax standpoint is that it 
is treated as a partnership, unless it elects to the contrary, for tax purposes.  
Thus, the enterprise and its members are governed by the rules of Subchapter K 
for tax purposes.80  Investors commit capital to the enterprise and a general 
partner manages the business for a fee of two percent of the contributed capital 
on an annual basis.   
 
Should the life of the partnership extend for seven years, the general partner 
would receive 14 percent of the investors’ capital in return for its management 
services.  With respect to these amounts, the general partner service provider is 
                                            
77 Id at 3. 
 
78 Management fees are taxed as ordinary income.  Depending upon the percentage of these 
fees compared to the return generated by the profits interests, the imperfection in the current 
treatment of private equity firms is not as extreme as alleged. 
 
79 See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3. 
 
80 I.R.C. §§ 7701 and 761 (2008); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1,-2, & -3 (2008).  See generally 
Willis et. al., supra note 12, at chs 1 & 3. 
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working for the partnership without risk and the return is determined without 
regard to entrepreneurial ownership.  The return on this expenditure of human 
capital is taxed appropriately as ordinary income. 
 
Additionally, the general partner typically puts “skin in the game” by contributing 
capital to the partnership similar to that of the investors.  The amount varies from 
one to five percent of the total contributions to the fund.81   
 
Subchapter K is intended to afford partners and partnerships flexibility in 
structuring their relationships.  In contrast to Subchapter C, in which equity 
ownership is typically consistent in its overall percentage ownership (dividend 
rights, liquidation rights, and dispositional rights) of the enterprise, Subchapter K 
openly permits, with various safeguards inapplicable in this context, variations in 
the partners’ percentage ownership of rights to capital, profits, and losses of the 
partnership.82   
 
The purpose for transferring the larger interest in profits than capital to the 
general partner apparently is reflective of a capitalistic transaction:  “Because the 
GP can earn significant compensation if the fund performs well, the fund 
managers are driven to work harder and earn profits for the partnership as a 
whole.”83  The tax treatment of the disproportionately larger profits interest is 
called into question.  
 
After formation of the private equity fund, the contributed capital is utilized for 
investment in failing or underperforming enterprises.  Using its expertise in 
selecting, rehabilitating, and financing the selected enterprises, after a period of 
time (typically two to seven years), the value of the underperforming businesses 
has either been restored or enhanced or has been determined to be no longer 
worth pursuing.  In either case, ownership of the enterprises is sold to others at a 
gain or a loss.   
 
Under the current tax law, the disposition of the rejuvenated businesses is 
determined at the partnership level and typically gives rise to capital gain or 
                                            
81 See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 8, acknowledging a capital contribution by the general partner:  
“The GP also contributes some of its own capital to the fund so that it has some ‘skin in the 
game.’”  The fund manager makes an outright capital investment and thus has an overall 
investment of human capital and invested capital, rather than the targeted transaction involving 
exclusively the investment of human capital.  Thus, the proffered quintessential example of a 
private equity fund deviates from the target of reform, i.e., the mere receipt of a compensatory 
profits interest.   
 
82 I.R.C. §§ 701-704 (2008).  See generally Willis et. al., supra note 12, at ch 10.  Section 704(b) 
imposes safeguards against excessive behavior in the allocations of partnership items by 
requiring them to possess substantial economic effect or to be in accord with the partners’ 
interests in the partnership. I.R.C. § 704(b) (2008). 
 
83 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 8. 
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capital loss.  The resuscitated businesses are assets which are not being held for 
sale in the ordinary course of the partnership’s trade or business.84  As a 
consequence, gain or loss is characterized as capital in nature.   
 
Under Subchapter K, each partner reports annually his distributive share of the 
partnership’s gain or loss as characterized at the partnership level.85  The partner 
is taxed currently even if the profits generated are not distributed to the partner.  
Once all of the partnership’s investments have been sold, the fund liquidates and 
distributes the remaining cash to the partners. 
 
In the compensatory context, critics misperceive the difference between a profits 
interest which is dependent upon uncertain future events and a capital interest 
which has liquidation value upon receipt.  While acknowledging that, if the fund 
performs poorly, the manager can walk away, it is assumed that a compensatory 
receipt of a profits interest has current and certain value worthy of current 
taxation.  However, in the example, the “carry” received by the fund manager has 
no liquidation value and is performance based; should the fund perform poorly, 
20 percent of zero is zero.  Risk and uncertainty exists for both the manager and 
the fund’s investors.  In fact, the managers of over 30 percent of private equity 
funds started between 1991 and 1997 never received a financial return on their 
profits interests.86 
VI. The Case Against the Current Tax Treatment of Profits 
Interests 
 
It has been alleged that the “tax rules treat partnership profits interests more 
favorably than other forms of compensation.”87  By utilizing the carry component 
of the compensatory arrangement, the recipients “defer the tax on income 
derived from their human capital.”88   
                                            
84 IRC § 1221 (2008).  See generally Willis et. al., supra note 12, at ch 9. 
 
85 IRC § 702(b) (2008).  See generally Willis et. al., supra note 12, at ch 9.  Regarding the 
legislative history of the provision, see Mary Louise Fellows, Partnership Taxation: Confusion in 
Section 702(b), 32 Tax L. Rev. 67 (1976). 
 
86 See Staff of the Joint Comm. On Taxation, 110th Cong., Present Law and Analysis Relating to 
Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests at 39.  An assumption that all, or even most, 
partnerships are profitable in any given year is often erroneous. For example, “historically, 
partnerships classified in the real estate and rental and leasing sector have dominated the 
statistics for both the number of partnerships and partners.” Tim Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Statistics of Income, 9/22/07 Stat. Income 69, available at 2007 
WLNR 26139102, para. 17. Yet, “prior to 1994, these partnerships reported total net losses for 
most (if not all) years on record.” Id.   
 






Unfortunately, while arguing for taxation at progressive rates from the investment 
of human capital in return for compensatory transfers of equity interests, critics 
fail to address and define the circumstances of when human capital has been 
invested as well as how much of the return on that investment should be 
attributed to human capital rather than invested capital.  In contrast to the 
discussion presented above illustrating the definitional issues and difficulties in 
disentangling returns on human capital from those on invested capital, critics 
frequently assume that the entirety of the return from the receipt of a 
compensatory equity interest should derive ordinary income treatment.89  
However, such is not the treatment under current law.90    
 
While questioning the deferral component derived from the receipt of a profits 
interest in a partnership, they fail to acknowledge that opportunities for deferral 
arise in other compensatory transfers of equity interests.  The deferral feature is 
present to some extent in virtually all transfers of compensatory interests in 
equity.91 
 
Over and above the preferential treatment of deferral, another criticism of such 
compensatory arrangements is that fund managers through their receipt of a 
profits interests “often” are able “to convert the character of [their return on labor] 
from ordinary income into long-term capital gain,” which is taxed preferentially.92  
This too is a mischaracterization of the current tax law.  Many profits interests 
generate ordinary income, because those partnerships produce ordinary income 
through the conduct of their profit-making activities, e.g., service partnerships, 
partnerships operating apartment buildings, restaurants, or movie theaters, etc. 
 
As mandated by § 702(b), the partner’s characterization of his distributive share 
of the partnership’s income is dependent upon the business-oriented or profit-
oriented activity conducted by the partnership.  The character of the income is 
determined by assessing the activities of the partnership with respect to the 
acquisition, retention, and disposition of its assets.  If the asset is capital in 
nature at the entity level, the activities of the partners are deemed irrelevant.  
                                            
89 See infra at notes 153-157 and accompanying text.  Many base their proposals on the 
assumption that these definitional issues do not exist and the human/invested capital distinction is 
irrelevant. See Aron-Dine, supra note 20 (favoring ordinary income method with entire amount of 
carried interest attributable to compensation for human capital); Cunningham & Engler, supra 
note 4 (acknowledging importance of distinction between human capital and invested capital, but 
providing no method for disentangling the two and failing to acknowledge that definitional issues 
may arise).  
 
90 We return later to a discussion of the normative treatment of compensatory receipts and 
whether current law requires reform.  See infra at notes 155-163 and accompanying text. 
 
91 See supra at notes 63-77 and accompanying text. 
 
92 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 3-4. 
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That characterization holds for all members of the partnership regardless of the 
nature of their involvement with the enterprise.   
 
Thus, partners contributing only invested capital nevertheless may derive 
ordinary income and those investing human capital may derive capital gain.  
Under current law, the focus is on the entity, not its members.  It is the effort of 
the enterprise which is determinative of the character of the income and thus at 
what rate the income will be taxed.  While challenging the ability of the return on 
the contribution of human capital to receive preferential treatment, critics do not 
insist upon consistent treatment for partners contributing invested capital who 
receive ordinary income treatment.93   
 
The conversion feature exists in every traditional compensatory transfer of an 
equity interest in a corporation and potentially exists with respect to every 
compensatory transfer of a capital interest in a partnership.94  Notwithstanding 
assertions to the contrary, Congress has purposefully authorized the conversion 
feature for most compensatory transfers of equity interests.95   
   
Such treatment is alleged to deviate from the norm:  “This conversion of labor 
income into capital gain is contrary to the general approach of the Internal 
Revenue Code and diverges from the treatment of other compensatory 
instruments.  Partnership profits interests are treated more favorably than other 
economically similar methods of compensation, such as partnership capital 
interests, restricted stock, . . .”96  However, as illustrated above, this is simply not 
the case.  The only difference between a compensatory profits interest and a 
compensatory capital interest in a partnership is the tax obligation on the date of 
receipt.  Furthermore, that difference is material as one has received something 
with a liquidation value on the date of the grant and the other has not.  In every 
other respect, the recipients will receive identical treatment throughout the 
entirety of their ownership of the interests.  
 
                                            
93 The concept works both ways and has been legislatively sanctioned.  If critics seek a more 
accurate determination of the return on human capital and invested capital, then their proposals 
should be expanded accordingly. 
 
94 If the partnership’s business activity produces exclusively ordinary income and all of its assets 
at the time of the service provider’s sale or liquidation of his interest are ordinary income assets, 
no conversion will occur. Partnerships in many industries as a whole report predominately 
ordinary income, including agriculture, mining, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale 
trade, transportation and warehousing, information, professional, scientific, and technical 
services, and health care. IRS Statistics of Income Division, Fall SOI Bulletin, July 2008. 
  
95 See supra at notes 43-53 and accompanying text. 
 
96 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4, concluding that a partnership profits interest currently is 




The reason for the sole distinction between the two is risk.  The recipient of the 
capital interest has liquidation value upon receipt, while the profits interest 
recipient’s economic enhancement is dependent upon future events as it lacks 
current liquidation value.  But from that point on, their tax consequences from the 
compensatory transfers will be identical.  The factor of risk is determinative.97 
Few, if any, can predict the future accurately.  Uncertainty and risk are everyday 
features of life.  Although the country is spiraling into economic crises, critics 
imply that these endeavors will invariably prove profitable.98 
   
With regard to compensatory profits interests, concern is expressed about the 
loss of efficiency caused by the presence of compensatory arrangements 
motivated by tax considerations, particularly through increased agency costs for 
the investors.99  Why agency costs are increased is not revealed.  The investors 
appear to pay less, not more, when compensatory profits interests are utilized 
because they have no initial compensatory outlay and only “pay” the fund 
managers if they are profitable.  If the fund does well, the investors share in its 
success.  If not, the investors minimize the amount of compensation paid to the 
managers.  Thus, efficiency apparently has been improved and agency costs 
decreased by the use of such arrangements. 
 
Critics further allege that this quirk in the tax law favors private investment firms 
over investment banks:  “This tax advantage for partnerships distorts the decision 
as to how to organize new business entities.”100  In making organizational 
decisions, is the compensatory benefit of a profits interest, should it exist, more 
important than the single level of taxation for partnerships compared to the 
                                            
97 The possibility that risk could factor in to differing treatment is ignored. See Aron-Dine, supra 
note 20; Cunningham & Engler, supra note 4; Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
 
98 These assumptions were likely attributable to the economic conditions at the time criticism 
against the tax treatment of private equity funds began to mount.  During that time, all 
investments seemed to appreciate.  As the private equity firm Blackstone went public, its fourth 
quarter earnings were in excess of $800,000,000.  In less than one year, its quarterly earnings in 
March 2008 had plummeted to $88,000,000, a decline of 89 percent.  Peter Lattman, 
Blackstone’s Hope--Do Dark Days Mean Opportunity? Wall Street Journal Mar. 11, 2008, at C3.  
Blackstone’s net income (loss) (in thousands) further reveals the genuine risk involved in 
receiving a profits interest:   2nd qtr 2008 $(156,531); 1st qtr 2008 $(250,993); 4th qtr 2007 
$(170,000); 3rd qtr 2007 $(113,190); 2nd qtr 2007 $774,351; 1st qtr 2007 $1,132,076; 4th qtr 
2008 $1,182,440; 3rd qtr 2006 $372,548; 2nd qtr 2006  $224,063; 1st qtr 2006 $487,155.  One 
can only imagine what the bottom line results will be in the third and fourth quarter of 2008. 
99 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
 
100 Id at 5. 
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double level for corporations?101  If so, why are these enterprises not shifting to 
partnership form, rather than remaining in corporate solution?102   
 
The conversion and deferral features of a profits interest in a partnership also are 
indicted as violating sound tax policy.  However, not every profits interest, even if 
profitable, produces preferentially taxed capital gain.  Many produce ordinary 
income.103  Of greater importance, as illustrated above, conversion and deferral 
attributes exist in the other four types of compensatory transfers of an equity 
interest in an enterprise. 
 
Finally, concerns over this preferential tax treatment and distributive justice have 
been raised.  Allegedly, this societal goal is undercut by the preferential tax 
treatment of the return on partnership profits interests.104   
 
The proponents of change agree that important factors must be taken into 
account in determining the appropriate tax treatment of compensatory receipts of 
                                            
101 However, additional concerns are confronted in making organizational decisions. See Victor 
Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 Tax L. Rev. 89 (2008) (admitting that non-tax issues are 
reflected in organizational structure as well and identifying a number of those factors). 
 
102 Between 1995 and 2005, the total number of new partnerships organized in the United States 
increased at a rate of only 5.7 percent (including both new entities and entities shifting from 
corporate to partnership classification). Tim Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Statistics of Income, 9/22/07 Stat. Income 69, available at 2007 WLNR 26139102. 
If choice of entity were so influenced by this “quirk” in the tax law, one would expect this number 
to be much larger. 
 
103 On this point, such a narrow focus leads to a faulty assessment:  “under current law, if the 
compensation is paid in the form of a profits interest, we estimate the return on human capital 
portion at zero and treat the entire amount, if and when it is received, as a return on investment 
capital.”  Fleischer, supra note 2, at 41.  However, many profits interests generate ordinary 
income for their recipients.  Ninety-nine percent of the return from the profits interest of every 
lawyer who is a partner in a law firm is ordinary income.  The profits interest of a partnership turns 
on the income generated by the partnership and under § 702(b) is characterized at the 
partnership level.  I.R.C. § 702(b) (2008).  Thus, the concern is narrower than implied.   
 
104 Some assert that the number of fund managers earning over $100,000,000 exceeded the 
number CEOs similarly situated at a nine to one ratio.  Fleischer, supra note 2, at 5-6.  
Unfortunately, the comparison is not of comparables as it is limited to reported income.  The 
income from a profits interest is reported annually.  However, CEOs with their corporate stock are 
taxed on salary, dividends, and/or stock received currently, but not on its appreciation in value.  
The author “compliments” the “much maligned” CEOs because they pay tax at 35 percent on 
most of their income in contrast to managers who inappropriately limit their civic contribution to a 
mere 15 percent.  However, even this assertion may be erroneous, because CEO’s reported 
income from their corporation may include dividends and gain from the disposition of their stock, 
both of which are taxed at 15 percent.  For a discussion of executive compensation disclosure, 
see Eric Dash, Executive Pay: A Special Report – More Pieces, Still a Puzzle, New York Times, 
Apr. 8, 2007 (finding even the bottom line compensation amount – meant to be an easy way of 




equity interests, such as influencing entrepreneurial risk taking, complexity, and 
inefficiency generated through excessive tax planning.105  Nevertheless, 
numerous proposals have been advanced, including “a rule treating all carried 
interest distributions as ordinary income” which has been embraced as “probably 
the most appealing policy option.”106  This normative proposal will be discussed 
below under proposals for reform.107  
VII. Criticism of Current Tax Treatment of Compensatory 
Transfer of Profits Interests 
  
Congress adopted specific tax treatment for the compensatory transfer of an 
equity interest in an enterprise which recognizes the uncertainty and tension 
between human capital and invested capital on the return from its receipt.  The 
governing compromise selected by Congress is ordinary income on the receipt of 
the interest and possible capital gain on its disposition.  In effect, current law 
recognizes that a return on human capital, if not withdrawn from the enterprise, 
may be conceptualized as a re-investment/conversion of human capital into 
invested capital. Thereafter, the future services are considered a de minimis 
adjunct to the invested capital and future growth is entitled, in certain 
circumstances, to preferential tax treatment.  
 
The putative contribution thereby ends the period for measuring the return on 
human capital and begins the period of return on invested capital.108  Even 
though the service provider continues to render services without additional 
compensation, Congress has concluded that this is the appropriate point in time 
at which to cease treating the tax consequences of the receipt as attributable to 
human capital. 
 
Regarding partnerships, an additional component, absent in the corporate 
context, in the characterization of the return on the expenditure of human capital 
is the income derived by the enterprise on an annual basis.  During the 
operational phase, § 702(b) mandates that the income of the partnership which is 
passed through to its partners is characterized at the partnership level.  Utilizing 
an entity approach, Congress concluded that the efforts of the enterprise, the 
vehicle though which the members conduct their profit-oriented activities, should 
be the focal point in the determination of whether any of its activities qualify for 
preferential tax treatment.   A partnership producing capital gain is effectuating 
                                            
105 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
   
106  Id. at 6.   
 
107 See infra at notes 170-173 and accompanying text. 
 
108 Differences exist between the corporate treatment and the partnership treatment.  See supra 
at notes 32-49 and accompanying text. 
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the tax policy behavior which Congress seeks to encourage.  The reward for 
such endeavors is a tax rate of 15 percent rather than 35 percent. 
 
In addressing the current state of the law, critics typically begin with the 
erroneous assumption that any return on human capital must be ordinary 
income.109  As illustrated above, this is not the case.  They then turn their 
attention to the current tax treatment of carried interests.110   
 
As recognized by the Service and the Treasury, a profits interest is not taxable 
upon receipt given the absence of liquidation value.  However, some suggest that 
this cannot be the case even while acknowledging that there is no certainty of 
success:  “This treatment seems counter-intuitive. The [general partner] receives 
something of value at the moment the partnership agreement is signed.”111    
 
In fact, the treatment of profits interests comports with the Code’s treatment for 
compensatory transfers of restricted equity interests in a business enterprise 
under § 83.  In those cases, value is certain but subject to conditions which are a 
prerequisite to vesting.  If the determinative factor for tax purposes is merely that 
something of value has been received, this is clearly a stronger case for taxation 
upon receipt than that of a profits interest.  The former requires the passage of 
time while rendering services.  The latter requires both the passage of time and 
the derivation of income by the enterprise.112  Yet, it is without question that 
restricted interests are not subject to tax currently, unless the taxpayer makes an 
affirmative election to do so under § 83(b).   
  
In assessing how profits interests should be taxed, the unique features of a 
compensatory profits interest are ignored, i.e., its use as an incentive in order to 
receive the services of a particular individual.  This is the sine qua non of the 
                                            
109 The failure to specifically define what constitutes a return on human capital clouds the issue, 
but it is assumed that, if the receipt of the equity interest is for services, all subsequent economic 
enhancement is attributable to human capital and should be taxed as ordinary income.  See 
Fleischer, supra note 2, at 27-32 (characterizing subsequent economic enhancement as 
“unrealized human capital” which should be taxed at ordinary rates) and Gergen, supra note 3, at 
94 (“if a partner performs services for a profits interest, and profits later are allocated to her in the 
form of earned income or an increase in her capital account to credit her with a share of 
unrealized gain, that allocation or increase should be treated as ordinary income. . . .”).    
 
110 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 9-16. 
 
111 Id at 10 to be contrasted with an earlier statement that if “the fund does badly; however, the 
manager can walk away.” Id at 3. 
 
112 The importance of risk in determining the proper tax treatment for such compensatory 
receipts is minimized in such advocacy.  For example, some assert:  “On the one hand, a carried 
interest is a valuable piece of property that often turns out to be worth millions and even hundreds 
of millions of dollars.”  (Emphasis added) Id at 10.  Nevertheless, after assuring the reader of its 
certainty of worth, it is subsequently noted that “the amount of carry is uncertain and 
unpredictable.” Id at 12. 
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grant.  The services of another, or any transferee of the service provider, would 
not suffice.  The vast majority of the population would lack the requisite expertise.  
Even those with the expertise may lack work habits, personality, and other 
intangibles, which likely were the reasons the enterprise did not approach him or 
her, rather than the service provider, with the same offer. 
 
As a consequence, a profits interest in a partnership is effectively non-
transferable, because its grant is tied exclusively to the efforts of its holder who 
possesses the requisite expertise sought by the enterprise.  If one could find a 
third party willing to purchase the interest, he or she would purchase nothing of 
value.113  Without the service provider’s continued rendition of entrepreneurial 
skill, the partnership is most unlikely to permit a third party lacking such skills to 
acquire the interest of the service provider and share in the future profits of the 
enterprise.  Thus, the interest of the service provider in essence is a restricted 
interest for which the attendant conditions are satisfied on a daily/yearly basis 
and, as met, the income attributable thereto is “received.” 
 
A frequently employed compensatory technique utilized in the corporate arena is 
restricted stock.  In such a case, § 83 puts the service provider to a choice.  The 
recipient can wait until the stock is vested and treat the value of the stock at that 
time as ordinary income.  Alternatively, the recipient can include it in ordinary 
income at its current value (without concern for most restrictions), receive a basis 
for tax purposes in the stock of an equivalent amount, avoid further tax 
consequence upon vesting, and treat all future appreciation as preferential 
capital gain.114 
 
From the recipient’s standpoint, conceptualizing the election as one of choice is 
difficult.  The well-informed service provider, almost without exception, will make 
the election due to the “superior skills” which he or she brings to the 
                                            
113 Some might assert that the interest of the service provider after two years of service, if his 
annual profits have not been withdrawn, would have liquidation value.  While true, as discussed 
below, that is because his or her past profits interest annually converts to a capital interest. See 
supra at notes 72-77 and accompanying text.  Furthermore, because he or she has taken the 
income into account annually, the basis for the partnership interest has increased accordingly, 
and the sale of those rights would have value.   
 
114 By way of example, assume that Charlotte in the above example receives her stock in 
Corporation C, but is subject to a four-year vesting period.  Without the § 83(b) election, she will 
have no tax consequences in Year 1.  When the stock vests in Year 4, assuming the value of the 
stock has appreciated from $500,000 to $2,084,000, she will have $2,084,000 of ordinary income 
and a basis of her stock of $2,084,000.  If she sold her stock in Year 5 for $4,000,000, she would 
recognize the $1,916,000 gain as capital in character and pay tax at the preferential rate.  With 
the election, she would have $500,000 of ordinary income, a basis for her stock of $500,000 in 
Year 1, and no tax consequences in Year 4.  In Year 5, she would have capital gain in the 
amount of $3,500,000. 
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compensatory relationship.115 In light of the restrictions and uncertainty attending 
the vesting of the stock, the recipient would insist upon cash or find other 
employment if there was substantial uncertainty in his or her mind as to its 
prospects for appreciation.116 
 
Surprisingly, critics in an effort to ensure that the return on human capital is taxed 
at ordinary income rates ignore this elective tax treatment which flies in the face 
of their goal.  If reforms are necessary to ensure that the return on human capital 
is taxed as ordinary income, then tax consequences should arise only upon the 
vesting of the restricted equity interests.  In fact, some reform proposals 
perpetuate this distortion by offering an election to the taxpayer as to the date of 
income inclusion, which by definition produces different results depending upon 
which of the two options is chosen by the taxpayer.117   
 
                                            
115 I am not saying that the service provider’s assumptions will prove accurate.  Instead, I am 
asserting that, given human behavior, the recipient in accepting stock conditioned upon the 
rendition of future services for a fixed period of time has clearly decided, upon the acceptance of 
the offer, that the endeavor will prove profitable. 
 
Importantly, a full understanding of how the tax law treats such compensatory arrangements 
under the elective feature requires the consideration of what happens if loss rather than gain 
arises notwithstanding the best efforts of the service provider.  Assuming that the stock plummets 
in value to $100,000 in Year 4 and $50,000 in Year 5, without the election, the executive has 
ordinary income of $100,000 in Year 4 and a basis of $100,000.  Upon its sale in Year 5, he or 
she would have a $50,000 capital loss, which is of little value to a taxpayer.  With the election, the 
executive has $500,000 of ordinary income in Year 1, a basis for the stock of an equivalent 
amount, no further tax in Year 4, and a $450,000 capital loss in Year 5.  
 
To exhaust the logical possibilities, the results produced under § 83 in case of forfeiture must be 
addressed.  Without the election, assuming the executive decides to take new employment in 
Year 3, no tax consequences would ensue and Charlotte would be left to ponder the wisdom of 
her ever having agreed to receive restricted stock as her compensatory stake in the enterprise.  
With the election, she would have $500,000 of ordinary income in Year 1.  Even though she 
would receive a basis in the stock of $500,000, § 83 prohibits a corresponding loss, even one 
characterized as capital, upon her forfeiture. 
 
116 Although a lack of hard data exists, by intuition it can be expected that service providers of 
new partnerships, or of partnerships embarking upon a new and hopefully profitable venture, will 
always believe in the future profitability of the enterprise as a result of their added expertise and 
will want to take advantage of the relative low initial value of their interest through a §83(b) 
election. See David A. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax-Advantaged? 84 B.U.L. Rev. 695, 
n.55 (2004) (“start-up company employees generally make the 83(b) election.") (citing E-mail 
from Ted R. Buyniski, Buck Consultants, to David I. Walker, Associate Professor, Boston 
University School of Law (Mar. 26, 2003). See also Michael S. Knoll, The Section 83(b) Election 
for Restricted Stock: A Joint Tax Perspective,  59 SMU L. Rev. 721, 726-27 (2006) (“early stage 
start-up companies often sell shares to key employees at a nominal value, which can be argued 
to be the fair market value of the stock in the fledgling venture.  Thus, employees of start-ups can 
make an 83(b) election and incur little or no current tax, and they generally do.") 
 
117 See infra at notes 188-190 and accompanying text. 
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If taxpayers are to render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, they should not be 
empowered with the right to make such a determination.  Sound tax policy 
principles dictate a fixed date and method for determination of the return on 
human capital.  Of one thing we can be certain; an election by the taxpayer 
cannot be the proper measure.118 
   
Partnership equity is divided into two categories—capital interests and profits 
interests.  Critics mistakenly consider the two compensatory devices to be 
separate and distinct and thus mutually exclusive.  As noted above, the exact 
opposite is the case.119  Profits interests become capital interests and capital 
interests are accompanied by profits interests.  But for the year of receipt, the tax 
consequences to either holder are identical over the life of the equity interest.  
 
There is a symbiotic relationship between a profits interest and a capital interest 
which can be elusive.  For example, some have stated that the “tax law provides 
a timing benefit for GPs by allowing deferral on their compensation so long as the 
compensation is structured as a profits interest and not a capital interest in the 
partnership.”120  This is not the case.  Compensatory capital interests in a 
partnership can be restricted and thereby provide deferral as well under § 83.  
Additionally, the recipient of an unrestricted capital interest is not currently 
taxable on future profits, even if relatively certain, due to the use of liquidation 
value in determining the amount of income to be included upon receipt.  Thus, 
the deferral benefit for profits interests is not as exceptional as others assert.   
 
Regarding the ability of the compensatory receipt to convert the character of the 
service provider’s return on human capital from ordinary to preferentially treated 
capital gain, some lament the unfairness of it all:  the equity “kicker is treated as 
investment income, not labor income, and is taxed at a lower rate than labor 
income.”121  The implication is that such treatment is unique to partnership profits 
interests.122   
 
                                            
118 I will return to this issue.  See infra at notes 192-194 and accompanying text.  However, the 
willingness to accept such treatment prevents some from discovering a more significant 
improvement for the taxation of human capital, i.e., the repeal of § 83(b).  This “quirk” is a far 
better target for reform than the current tax treatment of partnership profits interests.  
 
119 See supra at notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
 
120 Id at 13. 
 
121 Id at 15. 
 
122 Importantly, the mission of my response is to focus on both of the issues raised by the critics.  
The first is whether partnership profits interests under the current tax law are treated differently 
than other receipts.  On this issue, they are in error.   However, the second issue, which is 
whether the current treatment is sound from a tax policy standpoint and whether it can be 
improved, is discussed in detail below.  See infra at notes 136- 190 and accompanying text.   
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Again, such is not the case.  As has been fully documented above, conversion is 
not peculiar to partnership profits interests.123  Instead it permeates the treatment 
of compensatory receipts of virtually all equity transfers of interests in 
corporations and partnerships. 
VIII. The Issue of the Tax Treatment of Compensatory Transfers 
of Profits Interests Requires Renewed Scrutiny 
 
Spurred by the extraordinary profitability of private equity firms, some have 
suggestedted that there is an urgent need for a re-consideration of the 
appropriate tax treatment of the compensatory receipt of a profits interest124  
Based upon their assertion that the current treatment of a compensatory receipt 
of a profits interest is unique, providing inappropriate tax consequences, such a 
showing alone would warrant a re-examination of the area.   
 
Other developments and reasons are advanced justifying a re-examination of the 
area.  Acknowledging that the issue of the tax treatment of such compensatory 
receipts has become fairly well settled over the past 35 years, some inquire:  
“Why reopen the debate?”125 
 
Without empirical evidence, it is suggested that the use of compensatory profits 
interests has increased and their increased usage justifies a re-evaluation: “the 
increased use of partnership profits as a method of executive compensation in 
the context of private investment funds suggests the need for reform.”126  With 
regard to private equity firms, it is argued that changing sources of capital and 
the concern of economic efficiency require a re-examination of the tax treatment 
for profits interests.  The type of investor participating in private equity funds has 
migrated from individuals to institutional investors such as pension funds and 
university endowments, due to the increased use of intermediaries and the 
development of new investment strategies.   
 
However, the mere growth of a particular industry by itself should not impact the 
structure of partnership taxation.127  Something more should be required. 
                                            
123 See supra at notes 42–70 and accompanying text.   
 
124 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 16-27. 
 
125 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 16.  One wonders what the fate of any tax proposal will be after the 
economic meltdown of October, 2008.  The evolution of the tax law over the next two years is 
probably more uncertain than it has been in the last 50 years. 
 
126 Id at 16-17. 
 
127 At some level, given the existence of partnerships and the use of profits interests through 
which to compensate service providers, it is hard to imagine that private equity firms did not use 
them previously.  The more likely explanation is the size of the amounts generated by their use 




Centering on tax policy concerns, concern is expressed that different tax 
treatment is given to recipients of profits interests than the recipients of other 
compensatory equity interests:  “Economically similar transactions are taxed 
differently.”128  While disparate treatment for similar transactions offends sound 
tax policy, two factors are overlooked.  Of primary concern, the recipient in other 
compensatory transfers of equity interests has something of value at the moment 
of receipt.  The receipt of a profits interest, surrounded by uncertainty and lack of 
value, is not similar to the receipt of corporate stock or a partnership capital 
interest, both of which possess liquidation value and marketability.   
 
The second mistake in such advocacy is that the overall tax treatment of a 
compensatory transfer of a partnership capital interest is identical to the overall 
treatment of a profits interest except for the year of receipt.  Differences exist in 
the year of receipt and hence the reason for different tax treatment of the receipt.  
However, once received, the equity interests, both annually and upon liquidation 
or sale, are treated identically for tax purposes.    
 
Proceeding with a faulty premise, some maintain that this purported tax 
advantage distorts investment behavior.  The market is tax sensitive and moves 
accordingly, thereby resulting in “deadweight loss” and increased use of private, 
rather than public, markets.129  Section 83 is “the cornerstone of tax policy 
regarding executive compensation” and it requires that “property received in 
exchange for services be taxed as ordinary income.”130  While deferral is 
                                                                                                                                  
This populist rhetoric has resonated with Congress.  In the last year, two types of reform bills 
have been introduced.  One type of reform is industry specific, addressing the Blackstones of the 
world which went public.  In response, the proposals deny the exception to corporate status under 
§ 7704(c) for certain private equity funds.  As they would be taxed as corporations under the 
proposed legislation, profits interests, specific to partnerships, would no longer be available for 
publicly traded private equity firms. See Baucus-Grassley Bill, S. 1624 (110th Cong. 1st Sess), 
introduced by Senator Baucus on June 14, 2007. 
  
The other type of reform goes to the heart of the inquiry.  Under those bills, returns on certain 
profits interests for many partnerships would be required to be treated as ordinary income. See 
the Levin Proposal, H.R. 2834 (110th Cong., 1st Sess), introduced by Representative Sander 
Levin on June 22, 2007.  
 




130 Id at 25.  Advocates fail to recognize that, with the election of § 83(b), the recipients of 
restricted equity interests are permitted to more closely approximate the taxation of partnership 
profits interests even though the recipient has something of greater value and certainty than does 
the holder of a profits interest.  The election under § 83(b) undercuts the goal of maximizing the 
amount of the return from the expenditure of human capital which is taxed at progressive rates.  If 
anything, § 83(b) virtually eliminates the difference in tax treatment between a profits interest and 
a  restricted capital interest in the same partnership with an equivalent percentage interest in 
profits and losses  
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permitted for difficult to value receipts; conversion, i.e., ordinary income into 
capital gain, is not and violates the principles of sound tax policy.  Because the 
“treatment of partnership profits interests departs from this basic framework,”131 it 
is time for change. 
 
However, both assertions are erroneous.132  First, § 83 does not require that the 
entire return on property received for services be taxed as ordinary income.  As 
previously illustrated, only the front end of the transaction (the value upon receipt 
if unrestricted or the value upon vesting if restricted) is treated as ordinary 
income.  The rest is entitled to capital gain treatment in the corporate context.133 
Opportunities for conversion are possible, but more limited, for partnerships. 
 
Furthermore, the § 83(b) election permits the taxpayer to further limit his ordinary 
income at a revenue cost to the Treasury by electing  to value the interest on the 
day of receipt, even though no services have been rendered.134  Thus, the return 
on human capital is not treated as ordinary income.135  The election under  
§ 83(b) undercuts their goal of maximizing the amount of the return from human 
capital which is taxed at progressive rates.  If anything, § 83(b) permits the 
recipients of restricted equity interests to more closely approximate the taxation 
of partnership profits interests even though the recipient has something of 
greater value and certainty than does the holder of a profits interest.  
 
IX. The Normative Treatment of the Taxation of Human Capital 
Upon the Receipt of Compensatory Transfers of Equity Interests 
in an Enterprise 
 
                                            
131 Id.  
  
132 See supra at notes 110-112 and accompanying text. 
 
133 See supra at notes 24-36 and accompanying text.   
 
134 See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-ups, 57 
Tax L. Rev. 137, 168 (2003) (“The C corp structure allows employees to recognize much of this 
amount as capital gain through 83(b), which allows employees to elect to lock in the ordinary 
income amount at the initial valuation of the property, ensuring that any future appreciation is 
treated as capital gain. . . . Because of the liquidation preference attached to the preferred stock, 
entrepreneurs use a low valuation for the common stock when it is first received and make the 
83(b) election, which ensures capital gain treatment on the subsequent sale of the stock. This 
result generally can be replicated in the pass-through structure with some additional planning.”) 
 
135 Furthermore, deferral under § 83 does not turn on the difficulty of valuation; instead, it is the 
uncertainty of receipt.  Deferral is available under § 83 for receipts which are certain and precise.  
I.R.C. § 83(a) (2008) (the receipt of property in exchange for services “shall be included in the 
gross income of the person who performed such services in the first taxable year in which the 
rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property are transferable or are not 
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.”). 
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In their quest to improve the tax law, critics isolate transfers of a profits interest in 
a partnership in return for the rendition of services.  In their mind, this treatment 
is inconsistent with the treatment of other compensatory transfers of equity 
interests.  Accordingly, they urge reform in this narrow context.136   
 
Nevertheless, unwittingly they have called into question a serious issue of tax 
policy regarding the proper treatment of all such transfers.  Five such transfers 
are possible in the context of an enterprise.137  Even if the treatment of a profits 
interest is consistent with the treatment of other compensatory transfers, it does 
not mean that the field as a whole is not in need of improvement.  Thus, 
proposals for improvement should be considered in a broader context.   
 
Regardless of the current state of the law, how should the law treat such 
transfers as a whole?  Most commentators isolate two issues (deferral and 
conversion) regarding the tax treatment of compensatory transfers of equity 
interests in an enterprise—when should the receipt on human capital be taken 
into account and what character should it be given for tax purposes? 
A. Deferral   
   
There appears to be broad agreement among tax policy theorists for deferring 
the tax consequences on certain transfers of compensatory equity interests.  
First, as a society, we are reluctant to tax “endowment” and/or unrealized human 
capital.138  Second, tax policy supports the joining together of labor and capital.  
Finally, measurement and valuation issues in some settings warrant a 
postponement of taxation.139  A fourth factor, frequently overlooked, arises with 
regard to partnerships, i.e., without postponement, the recipient would 
“technically” be double taxed on the same income—once as valued upon receipt 
of the profits interest and again as earned.  In order to prevent such a possibility, 
additional remedial features would be needed in the Code, with a possible 
increase in overall complexity.  
 
                                            
136 This premise is faulty.  As documented above, the treatment is far more consistent than 
asserted.  If the only reason for change is the conclusion that its treatment deviates from the 
treatment of other receipts, they are mistaken and the status quo should be maintained. 
 
137 Transfers of a capital interest in a partnership, a restricted capital interest therein, a profits 
interest, stock in a corporation, and restricted stock in a corporation are the traditional types of 
transfers of enterprise equity. 
  
138  For more on endowment taxation, see Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 Duke L.J. 
1145, 1146 (2006). 
 
139 Some assert that deferral is questionable for a profits interest because they “have enormous 
economic value,” even while noting that such interests are incapable of valuation and, if the 
enterprise is not profitable, the holder will receive nothing.   Fleischer, supra note 2, at 27 and 12.  
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Regarding the five traditional types of equity interests which can be transferred in 
return for the service provider’s investment of human capital, three should qualify 
for deferral and two should not.  The receipt of an unrestricted interest in 
corporate stock or an unrestricted capital interest in a partnership should not 
qualify for deferral.  Consistent with the overall treatment of the current tax 
system for the determination of gross income, the requisites of realization and 
dominion and control should be determinative for normative purposes.  In both 
cases, property rights of value without restrictions have been received and few, if 
any, would suggest to the contrary.  Realization should take place on the receipt 
of cash or property.   
 
With respect to the other three types of receipts, a restricted interest in corporate 
stock, a restricted interest in partnership capital, and a profits interest in a 
partnership, deferral is warranted.  Difficulty in measurement and valuation are 
controlling factors justifying deferral.140  However, for normative standards, the 
determinative factor should be certainty of ownership; valuation issues should be 
irrelevant.  All three of these equity interests are subject to forfeiture.141  Without 
the certainty of permanent uninterrupted ownership, deferral is the preferred 
approach.  It coincides with actual economic enhancement and is dependent 
upon certainty of ownership and valuation once the contingencies have been 
satisfied.142 
 
Some have suggested that an annual accrual of a return on human capital would 
be preferable to deferral.143  However, they fail to extend a similar approach to a 
restricted capital interest in a partnership or restricted corporate stock.  Under 
                                            
140 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 2, at 27; Gergen, supra note 3, at 102; Aron-Dine, supra note 
20, at 10. 
 
141 Most commentators fail to recognize the inherent restrictions on the ability to transfer a profits 
interest.  If not explicit, certainly implicit in the grant is the continued service to the partnership by 
the recipient service provider.  Should the service provider decide to exit the partnership, almost 
without question, profits derived by the partnership thereafter would be reallocated to the other 
partners.  Furthermore, no one would pay more than a de minimis sum to purchase the profits 
interest for the same reason.  Thus, the strongest argument in favor of deferral under current law 
for a profits interest is that it is functionally indistinguishable from restricted stock or a restricted 
capital interest.   
 
142 The valuation of a profits interest looks to liquidation value, typically resulting in a 
determination that value is lacking, while restricted stock is valued on a broader basis.  
Accordingly, some view this treatment as objectionable.  While greater value may be attributed to 
the stock initially, no additional income other than upon disposition of the stock will be incurred by 
the recipient.  With regard to the holder of a profits interest, tax consequences (and its attendant 
tax liability) will arise annually.  Accordingly, any additional valuation upon receipt would result in 
over taxation on the front end of the ownership which would be offset later by corresponding 
losses.  Because these future returns will be taken into account, there is no reason from a policy 
standpoint to ascribe a future value to them. 
 
143 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 39-43. For an alternate method of annual accrual, see generally 
Cunningham & Engler, supra note 3. 
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any circumstances, it is difficult to accrue an indeterminate amount which is 
dependent upon future events.   
 
While the use of a surrogate for measuring the return on human capital is a 
possibility, it conflicts with a strong tax-policy interest in precision and accuracy.  
Any accrual approach involves an element of guesswork.  Deferral alone does 
not compromise these goals.  Instead, it effectuates them by awaiting events 
which document one’s economic enhancement.  Finally, deferral may even 
increase the amount of ordinary income from the return on human capital.  If the 
surrogate produces a figure which is less than the value of the interests once 
vested, some of the return on human capital avoids ordinary income 





r corporations because each 
artner must report his share of profits annually. 
 
 the 
terest in profits times the capital of the enterprise which he or she manages.145 
            
  
Critics address only the deferral aspects of the receipt of an equity intere
those of the retention and the disposition of the interest.  Deferral of tax 
consequences during the retention phase for operational income attribu
the equity interest until its sale or liquidation appears uncontroversial.  
Measurement is certain, economic enhancement is sure, and all are premised 
upon the concept of realization, upon which most income inclusions in our tax 
system are based.  Given the fundamental differences between partnerships and
corporations, the deferral period for the recipient of a partnership interest during
the retention period is typically shorter than that fo
p
 
While granting that the soundest explanation for deferral is the inability to 
measure the recipient’s income, either on a cash method basis or an accrual 
method basis, some nevertheless advance a proxy for its determination to be 
imputed to the service provider on an annual basis.  A “cost-of-capital method” is
proposed, under which an annual accrual of ordinary income would occur in
amount of a selected interest rate times the service provider’s percentage 
in
 
                                
 Similarly, the possibility arises of over-reporting the amount of return on human capital if the 
t the 
 
f deferral by proxy which is 
perfect. . .and is likely to undervalue the true amount of the increase in value of partnership 
 
144
surrogate imposition over the vesting period exceeds the value of the interest on the date tha
conditions are fulfilled. 
 
145 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 39-43. By way of example, assume that a private equity fund 
begins with $100,000,000 of capital.  Under the approach, the service provider receiving a 20 
percent profits interest would annually take $1,600,000 (8% x 20% x $100,000,000) into ordinary
income.  As a consequence, the proposal eliminates the benefit o
“im
assets that reflects a return on human capital, but it is undoubtedly more economically accurate
than current law, which estimates this amount at zero.” Id at 42. 
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Problematically, such an approach involves guesswork and over- or under- 
inclusion of the amount of income constituting ordinary income.146  Additiona
the proposal applies only to the receipt of a profits interest without extens




ndpoint, if producing meaningful reform, critics should subject similar 
t 
cing 
l at the 





compensatory transfers of equity interests to the same treatment. 
   
Comparable settings in which the general rules of realization are overridden for 
service providers are absent from the Code.  Why in this case are proxies 
required and not in others?  Pure capital appreciation arising from an investmen
in stock on a public market, while certain in value and susceptible of an annual 
determination, is not subject to tax on an annual basis.  The tax system fails to 
intervene because administrative ease and certainty are fostered by embra
the doctrine of realization.  A determination of the return on human capita
ti
amounts attributable to human capital and those to invested capital.147   
 
The cost of capital proposal adopts an approach similar to the statutory
to the tax treatment of interest free loans under § 7872.148  Thereunder, the 
income imputed to the service provider attributable to the interest-free 
component is accompanied by an imputed payment from the recipient to the 
party advancing the funds.  Thus, a question arises as to whether the ove
effect of both transactions currently or ultimately offset.  If so, the imputed income
and the corresponding deduction effectively cancel each other out.149  If 
premised under the operation of § 7872, they should, in which case the proposal 
                                            
146 But see § 7872 regarding interest free loans which utilizes a surrogate.  However, in those 
However, most profits interests 
ipt (“if and when it is received”).  Id.  A proxy to accelerate something which may never occur 
uld strike one as extreme and would add additional complexity in unraveling the imputation 
e 
settings, without a surrogate, tax consequences would be avoided.  Such is not the case for 
compensatory transfers of an equity interest in an enterprise. 
 
147 See infra at notes 157-163 and accompanying text. 
 
148 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 41.  Such a proposal strays from the foundational principles of 
Subchapter K by suggesting that an annual measurement of return is not possible for a profits 
interest.  Conflating the concept with the experience a particular industry, assertions are 
advanced which are true in only a small number of cases:  “We cannot measure the returns on 
human capital directly; under current law, if the compensation is paid in the form of a profits 
interest, we estimate the return on human capital portion at zero and treat the entire amount, if 
and when it is received, as a return on investment capital.”  Id.  
function in exactly the opposite way.  Profits are derived annually and flow through to the service 
provider.  Secondly, this advocacy undercuts the need for a proxy because of the uncertainty of 
rece
sho
should the actual income not equal the imputed proxy amount. 
 




accomplishes little from a deferral standpoint because the imputed income is 
.150   
ip?  
n acceleration of tax consequences would ensue if the parties 
greed to eliminate the conditions which must be fulfilled prior to a vesting of 
f 
n 
 consistency in the treatment of equally 





and minimize complexity.   Additionally, deferral extends to any restricted 
merely to compensatory interests in partnership profits. 
 
offset either currently or sometime in the future by a corresponding deduction
 
Finally, from a normative perspective, if deferral is appropriate for restricted 
equity interests, should a recipient be able to accelerate his or her tax 





Under current law, the use of the § 83(b) election permits the recipient of a 
restricted entrepreneurial interest to cap the amount of ordinary income in the 
year of receipt.  The increase in the value of the stock or the capital interest 
through the rendition of services over the mandated period of service is deferred 
until the sale or liquidation of the interest.  The best approach on the issue o
deferral is to tax the service provider on his or her receipt of an equity interest o
the date of realization only.  Any system permitting a choice by the service 
provider of some other date undercuts
s
should be tied to a realization event. 
 
Deferral’s impact on the determination of the proper return on human capita
been lamented by some:  “In sum, in circumstances where a partnership’s 
income is deferred by reason of the realization doctrine, current law allows 
deferral of returns on human capital.”151  The difficultly with this analysis is that 
such treatment is the essence of the realization doctrine.  Instead of guesswork
and subsequent offsetting adjustments to the extent the initial estimate fails 
accurate, the law adopts a wait-and-see approach in order to ensure certain
152
equity interest, not 
B. Conversion 
 
Regardless of the various tax policy concerns and principles, the heart of the 
target is the possible conversion feature of a compensatory transfer of a 
partnership profits interest.  Many of the tax reform proposals turn on the need to 
ensure that ordinary income is attributed to some portion of the return from the
                                            
150 If such an approach were adopted, it would require further integration with the tax treatment of 
the actual profits generated annually.  Would the annual imputation absorb, to the extent thereof, 
ofits for the year?  How would overages be treated?  What if lesser amounts were 




151 Id at 43. 
 
152 Some vacillate in selecting their target for reform by asserting that “current law works well in 
most contexts outside of investment partnerships.”  Id at 43. 
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profits interest.  If the expenditure of human capital is to be taxed properly, i.e., at 
died, 
   
 
e average tax rate rises with income.”   While the 
eneral proposition is technically correct, the assertion glosses over the 
 
rn.   However, given the absence of 







uman capital, even upon a disposition of the interest.   Any and all returns are 
                                         
ordinary income rates, the “quirk” in the current law which permits a return on 
human capital to be taxed at the preferential capital gain rate must be reme
not merely for profits interest but for all compensatory equity transfers.153
 
Advocates assert that most “tax scholars agree that we ought to tax labor income
progressively so that th 154
g
important definitional issue of what constitutes a return on human capital and 
when, if at all, such a return, if left in the enterprise and not withdrawn, converts
to invested capital.155  
 
Without explanation, critics appear to assume that if a profits interest is received 
for the rendition of services, ordinary income taxed at the progressive rates is 
appropriate for the entirety of the retu 156
c
the conversion feature attributable thereto, the status quo for those receipts goes
unchallenged.  If so, what separates the return from human capital for the
four from that for a profits interest?  
 
The range of possibilities for selection of the normative standard for determining
the return on human capital is vast and the alternatives numerous.  One 
approach is a characterization from the front-end of the transaction, i.e., if t
equity interest was received for services, any and all financial return over th
of the interest is taxable as ordinary income. Everything constitutes a re
157h
ordinary income because the totality of the recipient’s “contribution” to the 
   
en into 
t 
 Some mistakenly assume that most, if not all, profits interests permit conversion.  See The 
y. See supra note 94 for a 
ample of business sectors in which partnerships report predominately ordinary income. 
ess profits interests and the return from human capital, under their view, 
e other four types of equity interests should be treated similarly.  
 Code. 
153 Surprisingly, while advocating a tracing approach in which ordinary income will be tak
account, some nevertheless propose a taxpayer election under which deferral or conversion is 
possible, but not both.  See infra at notes 186-190 and accompanying text. 
 
154 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 43. This appears to be the cornerstone of most, if not all, 
justifications for the proposals for change. See, e.g., Aron-Dine, supra note 20, at 2-3; Statemen
of Senator Max Baucus, July 11. 2005, para. 3-5; Cunningham & Engler, supra note 4, at 4.   
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Levin Proposal, supra note 20; Aron-Dine, supra note 20.  Such is not the case to the lament of 
numerous doctors, lawyers, and accountants throughout the countr
s
 
156 While they only addr
th
 




enterprise was the rendition of services.158  The parties transacted for the 
rendition of services, and thus any return derives from human capital.  
 
Under this analysis, the relationship of the service provider to the enterprise is 




ccordingly, an insistence upon ordinary income for the entirety of 
e return appears excessive.  The overall appreciation in the value of the 
ld 
h 
rocuring the services would have been and basing the annual or 
tal ordinary income component on that amount.  If procuring the services on the 
n this 
re
deserves similar treatment.159  Of course a major difference is that the service 
provider is foregoing direct payment and, unlike the employee, possesses 
ownership interest in the enterprise, with the inherent risk that attaches to the 
marketplace.   
 
The difficulty with such an approach is that it ignores other factors in the ma
place. The future appreciation of an enterprise may be attributable to any 
combination of three factors—profitability due to the conduct of the business, 
inflation, and appreciation in the value of the tangible and intangible assets of t
enterprise.  A
th
enterprise may well have occurred even if the service provider never participated 
in its growth.  An effort to trace precisely the source of such appreciation wou
be administratively burdensome, possibly impossible to accomplish, and thus 
unworkable. 
 
In isolating the human capital component of the overall return, another approac
is to utilize an appropriate surrogate through which to approximate what the 
cost/value of p
to
outside market from an unrelated third party would have cost $200,000, the
figure could serve as the ceiling for the amount of ordinary income to be taken 
into account.  Anything in excess of that amount would qualify for preferential 
treatment.160 
                                            
158 This approach is favored by some, including the Levin Bill. See The Levin Propsal, supra note 
ine, 
 e.g., Aron-Dine, supra note 20, at 3 (asserting that if the business entity were a 
orporation, rather than a partnership, the service provider would be an employee) and Fleischer, 
d 
eturn 
 would be ordinary income and any excess entitled to capital gain.  Of course, 
roblems are confronted if the overall receipt is less than the amount previously taken into 
ice 
 
f income from high-bracket to low-bracket taxpayers, the members’ distributive 
hares must be determined after taking into account a reasonable amount as compensation for 
20. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has also taken this approach. See Aron-D




supra note 2, at n.43 (comparing receipt of profits interest to an employee’s receipt of corporate 
stock). 
 
160 Assuming a four-year period prior to disposition, the equity interest recipient would be require
to report $200,000 of ordinary income annually or, given the absence of funds in hand, the r
could be viewed as attributable to an open transaction and taxed only upon actual receipt.  Thus, 
the first $800,000
p
account for tax purposes.  An offsetting loss or deduction would be required to make the serv
provider whole. 
 
A similar approach exists in § 704(e) regarding family partnerships.  Thereunder, in order to




This approach prioritizes the return on the equity interest as attributable to 
human capital.  Additionally, it ignores the risk and uncertainty of receipt.  Using 
ur models, the employee is certain of a specific return over time, with very little 
ing 
y be 
rvices.  However, the funds which the service provider would have 
therwise extracted from the enterprise have instead remained in the enterprise.  
 




ocusing on this side of the equation, other than the initial receipt of the equity 
be 
t.  
00,000, $130,000 could be 
ttributable to human capital, i.e., the after tax amount in the pure employee 
 
o
risk as to its receipt.  In the enterprise context, the service provider is assum
real risk as to his or her return.  Furthermore, any shortcoming in return ma
attributable to the other components of the value of the enterprise and unrelated 
to the impact on the economic well being of the enterprise due to the efforts of 
the equity holder.    
 
The above-discussed approaches are premised on the assumption that the 
return on human capital is attributable exclusively or predominantly to the 
rendition of se
o
To what extent, if any, is future appreciation in the enterprise attributable to the 
extra amounts now available to the enterprise for investment and use in the
ongoing business activities?  Should the service provider be viewed to some 
extent as re-investing the foregone compensation in the operations of the 
enterprise?   
 
If
his human capital entitlement for the use of the enterprise, different results 
ensue.  Accordingly, an argument could be made that the service provider ha
contributed $200,000 per year to the partnership by failing to extract an amou
equivalent to a third-party salary.  This could be conceptualized as a contribu
in some measure, of invested capital.   
 
F
interest which augers for characterization as a return on human capital, any 
return thereafter could constitute a return on invested capital which might 
taxed preferentially.  Importantly, foregoing the withdrawal of funds from the 
enterprise has economic significance and arguably converts them from human 
capital to invested capital.    
 
Other variations are possible utilizing a bifurcated approach in the year of receip
For example, if the value of the services is $2
a
setting, and the remainder ($70,000) attributable to invested capital.161  Utilizing
these ratios, taxation could be postponed until realization and, similar to the tax 
                                                                                                                                  
chapters 2 and 9. 
 
services rendered by the donor, unless otherwise provided.  See Willis, supra at note 4 at 
161 In any case, the recipient will have to find other sources of funds with which to pay the 
attendant tax liability.  In contrast to the pure employee setting in which he or she has the cash 
(most likely it has been withheld and paid directly to the Service), the service provider has 
received only an ownership interest in an enterprise. 
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treatment for installment sales, 65 percent would be attributable to human ca
taxed accordingly at ordinary rates, while the remaining 35 percent would b
return on invested and taxed preferentially.  
 
As illustrated, in the search for normative treatment, many possibilities present 
themselves. Regardless of whether the issue of how t
pital 
e a 
o treat the overall return on 
e compensatory receipt of an equity interest generates unanimity of opinion 
e logical 
 
een, in attempting to separate the two, current 





vestment of human capital in the 
nterprise.  The failure to withdraw his or her return on human capital results in 
 
 
and the return on invested capital begins. 
                                           
th
from a tax policy standpoint, a number of differing approaches have som
basis for their adoption.  However, the purity and simplicity of the employee
setting is replaced with complexity due to the difficulty of disentangling the 
mixture of contributed human capital and the re-investment of the return as 
invested capital.162  As we have s
ta
one on invested capital, rather than human capital.    
 
Importantly, many of the proposals for change ultimately resort to some 
combination of human and invested capital as the source for the return on 
compensatory transfers of equity interests.163  It is conceptually difficult, if not 
impossible, to deny that some portion of the return is entitled to preferential 
treatment under the curr
 
Once one accepts the fact that the normative treatment requires the recognition 
of both components as producing the return, the status quo emerges as a stro
candidate for the proper treatment of such returns.  The current tax law generally
bifurcates the return from compensatory transfers of equity interests into (1) a 
return on human capital and hence ordinary income upon receipt and (2) a return
on invested capital, which depending upon the circumstances may generate 
capital gain thereafter.  
 
The tax policy rationale supporting the conversion feature for the five traditional 
equity interests in the enterprise is the re-in
e
an accumulation of funds in the enterprise which permits the re-investment of 
that amount in the capital of the enterprise, with which it can invest and engage
in other activities furthering the goals of the profit-generating enterprise.  At a 
minimum, this entanglement of contributions to the enterprise explains why 
Congress currently utilizes a combination treatment of the service provider in 
these settings, selecting a cut-off point at which the return on human capital ends
 
162 Some, while acknowledging that such complexity exists, propose solutions requiring the 
bifurcation of human and invested capital, without any suggestion for how such separation could 
be accomplished. See generally Cunningham & Engler, supra note 4. 
 
163 Some, while suggesting that the baseline for the return should be ordinary income, conclude 
that an elective provision affording conversion is preferred.  See Fleischer infra note 2 at 16.  But 








improved.  Critics, albeit exclusively in the context of profits interests, advance 
various proposals to which I will add my own.  However, once one accepts that 
the proper treatment will be a blended one involving features of deferral and 
conversion, the status quo becomes the front runner, if for no other reason than 
is the product of years of trial and error by Congress, Treasury, and the Service.
X. Reform Alternativ  
 
atter of tax 
 a good tax, because all 
ave come to accept it and have adjusted their activities accordingly.   
innovation for publicly-held corporations.   The status quo ensures 
“gamesmanship” in the structuring of such investment vehicles, which efforts are 
d 
 
Acknowledging the complexity of determining the normative treatment of these 
tax issues, while minimizing their presence and continuation in the Code for more
than 50 years, critics, like our recent presidential candidates, conclude that 
change is necessary.  As a consequence, they advance a range of solutions to 
the problem.164 
A. The Status Quo 
 
Having concluded that “the status quo is an untenable position as a m
policy,”165 some nevertheless address it directly and note that the status quo of 
deferral and possible conversion has the benefit of “being predictable and well-
understood.”166  From a policy standpoint, an old tax is
h
 
Nevertheless, they speculate that existing subsidies through the use of a profits 
interest lower the cost of capital for venture capital start ups and disadvantages 
167
wasteful, increase agency costs, circumvents our progressive tax system, an
undermines “public confidence in the tax system.”168   
                                            
164 Revealing the complexity of the issue, some assert that some conversion is acceptable 
ecause an: “entrepreneurial risk subsidy of some sort arguably makes sense as a matter of tax 
conomics literature suggests that there are positive externalities associated with 
ntrepreneurship.”  Fleischer, supra note 2, at 47.  Accordingly, “some tax subsidy for 





d from labor, which as previously discussed is not as clear as 
e has determined.  To the extent that public confidence is undermined, it may be attributable to 
b








167 Again, given this assertion, it is surprising that the increase in the number of new partnershi
is not larger than 5.7 percent per year. See supra note 91. 
 
168 Id at 50.  By way of example, note the populist rage underlying the class warfare as expressed
by one critic:  “Taxing labor income of fund managers at a low rate is a severe departure from
widely accepted norms, and it ought to be addressed.”  Id.  The problem is that the advocate 




However, as evidenced by a fuller exploration of the entirety of the area
status quo is far more defensible than acknowledged.  Regarding the five ty
of equity interests, under the status quo, deferral is justifiable for three given the 
failure of the recipient to receive anything of value; conversion is justifiable in all 
five by the re-investment of human capital rationale discussed above.  
Furthermore, notwithstanding allegations to the contrary, the investment of 
human capital in return for a pro
, the 
pes 
fits interest frequently generates ordinary income 




urprising that the tax treatment of partnerships adopts a compromise between 
.  
 
ffered to date, the status quo appears superior.  As discussed below, it will be 
 is the simplest method for the proper treatment for the return on 
e expenditure of human capital.170  Under this approach, the receipt of a profits 
 
activities.171   
                                                                                                                               
a
partnership context does not guarantee that the return will be taxed as capital 
gain.  Depending upon the business activities of the partnership, invested cap
can generate ordinary income. 
 
Another unappreciated factor in an analysis of the status quo is that partnerships 
are fundamentally different than corporations for tax purposes.  The latter is 
potentially subject to double taxation, while the former is taxed but once at the 
partner level. The three types of equity interests in a partnership, once veste
generate annual tax consequences.  Furthermore, partnerships fall between sole
proprietorships and corporations on the business continuum.  It should not be 
s
the two extremes.  Congress specifically adopted such an approach under  
§ 702(b) in specifying that the income derived by a partnership is attributable to 
all partners regardless of how they acquired their interests 169
While other improvements may come to mind, at least with regard to those 
o
even more so should my proposal for reform be adopted. 




interest constitutes an open transaction and distributions are taxed as ordinary 
income regardless of the nature of the partnership’s business and investment
   
Rev. 69 
pproach overlooks the current distinction in Subchapter K between the derivation of 
rofits and the distribution of property.  Possibly, it is assumed that the profit component will not 
published academic articles, media accounts, and related comments that fail to integrate the 
taxation of profits interests with the treatment accorded the other four types of compensatory 
receipts of equity interests. 
 
169 See Fellows, supra note 85.  See generally Willis et. al., supra at note 12, at ch 9. 
 
170 Mark P.Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K:  Compensating Service Partners, 48 Tax L. 
(1992). See also Aron-Dine, supra note 20 (advocating an entirely ordinary income approach) 
and The Levin Proposal, supra note 20. 
 




Such treatment, i.e., taxation upon distribution, conflicts with current law whic
forces income inclusion as earned by the partnership, not upon distribution.  
Under this proposal, the service partner could derive greater deferral benefits 
than are currently available by postponing the distribution of his share of the 
business profits.  Thus, with respect to 
h 
the issue of deferral, the proposal would 
ot be an improvement in the tax treatment of such receipts.  In fact, it would 
s 
the failure of the service 
rovider to withdraw his or her share of earnings attributable to services can be 
1’s 
 
nterests and treat all income derived therefrom as ordinary 
come is unclear.  The logic of their position suggests that they would, because 
 
uld 
lanning device creates an unrealistic situation.   If the 
quity recipient is providing services as well as capital, he or she will insist upon 
n
generally extend the time for income realization, with additional complexity for its 
integration into the earnings process.  
 
The proposal eliminates the conversion potential for profits interest.  However, a
previously discussed, the return on human capital through a profits interest 
frequently produces ordinary income.  Additionally, 
p
conceptualized as a contribution of invested capital.  For partnerships, Year 
profits, if not withdrawn, become Year 2’s capital.   
 
Whether others would extend their proposed treatment to all compensatory
transfers of equity i
in
they assume that all returns on the investment of human capital generate
ordinary income.   
 
With the adoption of such an approach, some have suggested planning 
techniques through which the limitation could be circumvented.172  For example, 
a general partner could borrow funds and purchase a capital interest which wo
achieve deferral and conversion, because the return would be derived from 
invested capital rather than human capital.  The problem with this circumvention 
technique is that the p 173
e
                                                                                                                                  
be derived until the year in which the partnership is liquidated.  Such an enterprise is the 
exception rather than the norm.  See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 19.  Accordingly, complex
arises with regard to ongoing enterprises, the distributions from which are not in sync with the 




172 See Fleischer, supra note 2, at 51-52.  
 
173 Some undermine the initial assumption of the clarity between the return on human capital and 
the return on invested capital by acknowledging that they may be intertwined, possibly 
inextricably:  “the challenge of precisely separating returns on human capital from returns on 
investment capital suggests that rough justice might be an acceptable result.”  Id at 51.  
Compounding the confusion of their goal, i.e., the separation of returns on human capital from 
returns on invested capital, they embrace the status quo of the Code by proposing elective 
treatment to be determined by the taxpayer because an “elective approach would be consistent 
with the tax Code’s general approach to executive compensation.” Id at 51-52.  As I have 
emphasized, this elective feature dramatically undercuts the effort to tax human capital 
appropriately and should be repealed.  See supra at notes 188-193 and accompanying text. 
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a profits interest for the contributed human capital as well as a capital interest for 
the invested capital.  
 
Logically, such a proposal should be broadened and applied to all compensatory 
transfers of equity interests in enterprises since the entirety of the contribution by 
ition of services on behalf of the 




nder this method.  Proponents acknowledge that 
verything would turn on valuation, which invariably provides opportunities 
ot 
y 
liquidation value has been adopted as the governing standard under current law.  
While not insurmountable, the possibility of “double taxation” is confronted.  
Technically this is a misnomer because “homeostasis” will out.177  Income would 
                                           
a service provider in their view is the rend
en
return on the expenditure of human capital as ordinary income.  Thus, the current 
treatment of a compensatory profits interest is not as aberrational as suggested.  
The adoption of the proposal would treat a profits interest in a more onerous 
fashion than the other four compensatory transfers of equity interests in an 
enterprise. 
C. The Forced Valuation Method 
  
Another proposal involves a greater emphasis on valuing the original receipt of a
profits interest in a partnership.174  Accordingly, instead of relying on liqui
value which invariably leads to a valuation of zero, some would broaden the 
inquiry by taking other factors into account.  While reducing deferral, conversio
would still be possible u
e
through which to minimize adverse consequences.175   
 
Unfortunately, as described earlier, such an approach ignores the implicit, if n
explicit, restrictions on the receipt of a profits interest.176  Almost without 
exception, it is conditioned upon the performance of services, something to be 
done in the future.  Until they are rendered, the marketability of the interest is 
virtually non-existent.   
 
Other computational difficulties are inherent in the proposal, which reveal wh
 




176 See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text. 
 
177 The system of Subchapter K operates in perfect fashion to ensure that in all cases the overall 
result will balance out.  If the original value were $100,000 and the recipient’s share of profits over 
four years were $70,000, he would have been taxed on $170,000.  His basis would increase both 
on the initial taxing event and each year thereafter as profits were earned.  Upon liquidation of his 
interest for $70,000, his share of undistributed profits, he would incur an offsetting loss of 
$100,000.  Thus, he would have been taxed on $170,000 which would be offset by a loss of 
$100,000 for a net profit from his ownership of the profits interest in the partnership of $70,000.  
Obviously, time value and character considerations make this a less than desirable approach.   
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arise on valuation, leading to an equivalent amount of basis for the interest in t
partnership.  As profits are earned (assuming they are undistri
he 
buted), income is 
llocated to the service provider and basis is increased.  Upon liquidation, the 
et by a subsequent capital loss.   
 
  However, even proponents minimize the 
orth of this particular reform proposal:  “There is little reason to believe that 
 
ibilities 
ould continue.   Advocates maintain that the cost-of-capital method provides 
 
otwithstanding criticism of both the deferral and conversion possibilities of 
tion.  
vider.  
le, assume that the fund manager general partner invested 
5,000,000 in a $100,000,000 private equity firm.  Using the cost-of-capital 
approach and a six percent rate of interest, the general partner would be imputed 
                                           
a
double taxing of the profits will be offset by a corresponding loss.  Time value 
issues will be implicated and, under the current statutory regime, one could 
experience the opposite of the reformers’ concern—ordinary income reported 
twice for tax purposes offs 178
These concerns are seldom addressed.
w
forcing valuation of partnership profits interests in this fashion would lead to a
more salutary result.”179  
D. The Cost-of-Capital Method  
 
Under this approach, deferral would be reduced but conversion poss
180w
a greater risk subsidy, but minimizes the possibilities for manipulation.181  Of
course, because conversion is possible, the proposal undercuts efforts at reform 
and acknowledges the entanglement of human and invested capital in such 
settings.  Accordingly, any indictment of the status quo loses force. 
 
N
returns on human capital, some reformers advance their own Solomonic solu
Under this approach, recipients would be allocated an annual amount of ordinary 
income determined by taking a specified market rate of interest times their 
percentage interest in profits times the capital under management.182  
  
In essence, the opportunity for the service provider is conceptualized as the 
functional equivalent of an interest-free loan.  Employing § 7872, ordinary income 




178 Another approach which would minimize the effect of valuation upon receipt would be to 
permit the recipient to amortize the amount of the initial valuation over a fixed time period.  
Accordingly, as the annual profits from the partnership were taken into account, they would be 
offset by the amortization deduction.  Difficulties would be encountered in determining the 
appropriate period for amortization.  See I.R.C. § 197 (2008) (utilizing a 15-year period). 
 
179 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 18. 
 
180 Id at 59. 
 
181 Id at 52. 
 
182 Id. at 53. 
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$1,140,000 (6% x 20% x $95,000,000) of ordinary income annually attributable to




rdinary income would accrue annually, resulting in an increase in the partner’s 
e 





he increasing basis would give rise to 
n offsetting loss upon liquidation, but the consequence would be greatly 
r 
xity rampant in 
ubchapter K.  First, it assumes a fixed profits interest in all items generated by 
al 
 proposal is whether it encompasses all of the underlying 
ssumptions of the statutory safeguard which it models.  The proposal and the 
 
borrower, which results in the imputed income to the fund manager of 
                                           
O
basis for his partnership interest.  All other activities of the partnership would b
governed by current law.  Accordingly, should the partnership invest in preferred 
assets, conversion to capital gain would remain possible.    
 
Advocates characterize the proposal as one advancing the goal of neutrality, 
w
The approach “reduces the incentive to unduly favor partnership profits intere
over other economically equivalent forms of compensation, and it thus reduces
economic distortions in contract design and minimizes planning opportunities.”183 
 
In point of fact, the proposal would have negative consequences.  While the 
imputed income increases basis, actual profits derived by the partnership a
taken into account as well resulting in an additional acceleration of tax.  Th
situation in which the “double taxation” would not arise would be years in which 
the partnership produced no profits.184  T
a
deferred, possibly resulting in the most offensive of circumstances for an 
entrepreneur—an acceleration and duplication of ordinary income offset at a late
point in time by a long-term capital loss. 
 
The simplicity of the proposal deviates widely from the comple
S
the partnership.  In many partnerships, partners’ interests may vary according to 
the type of income generated.  Thus, the executive’s investment of human capit
may extend to only a portion of the partnership’s activities.    
 
A final concern with the
a
analogue of an interest free loan are distinguishable from that of the service 
provider, because no advancement of funds in a loan context has taken place
between the parties.   
 
If § 7872 is the model,185 two events are deemed to have taken place.  First, 
foregone interest is deemed to have been transferred from the lender to the 
 
183 Id at 54. 
 
184 In the partnership world of taxation, “all’s well that ends well.”  Homeostasis will out. 
 
185 One advocate specifically modeling his proposal after § 7872 is Leo L. Schmolka. See 
Schmolka, supra note 3, at 288. 
 
 62
$1,140,000.  However, a second component of the transaction is taken into 
account as well, i.e., a return transfer of the determined amount to the lender as 
e payment of interest.  Taken to its logical extension, the amount included in 
d of a 
 capital, i.e., segregating the initial portion of the transaction 
as generating the return on human capital and the remainder as attributable to 
erior because it involves actual rather than 
utative results.  
 
 
pproach would serve them best.  Should 
ey have a strong preference for some conversion and some deferral, it would 
, it 
tem that more accurately isolates the 
turn on human capital and taxes it accordingly.189  Given my prior criticism of 
, will 
produce different, rather than similar, results among similarly-situated taxpayers.  
                                           
th
income is offset by the deemed payment of interest as is typically the case for 
interest-free loans in a compensatory setting.   
 
In order to avoid this quandary, some propose a basis adjustment instea
current deduction.  While avoiding one problem, it creates another.  “Double 
taxation” with all of its difficulties is resurrected.  Additionally, as discussed 
previously, it is far from clear why one would override firmly established 
principles of realization and substitute a proxy for what is actually taking place.  
Given that the status quo performs the same disentanglement between human 
capital and invested
invested capital, the status quo is sup
186p
E. Talent-Revealing Election 
 
This proposal combines the cost-of-capital proposal with the ordinary income 
proposal.  The default rule would be ordinary income, but the entrepreneur could
elect the cost-of-capital method.187  Similar to the § 83(b) election, taxpayers
would make a judgment as to which a
th
be available.  Basically, the proposal incorporates the features of two of the 
previously discussed alternatives.188 
 
The difficulty with the proposal is that it dramatically undercuts its premise, i.e., 
because the Code has been less than precise in its taxation of human capital
is in need of reform by developing a sys
re
both proposals, their combination only increases, rather than decreases, the 
deficiencies attendant to the proposal.  
 
Giving the recipient a choice in how he or she wishes to report the receipt of a 
compensatory equity interest grants him or her excessive and exclusive 
autonomy over the tax treatment of the return.  An election, by definition
 
186 As illustrated, while the status quo segregates the return on human capital from the return on 
invested capital, invested capital can generate ordinary income consequences as well. 
 
187 Id at 54. 
 
188 Id at 54-56. 
 
189 Id at 54. 
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Advocates celebrate its consistency with the status quo treatment under § 83 for




partnerships.   In doing so, they fail to detect the deviation from the normative 
 provision under current law. goal that exists in the elective
XI. A Modest Proposal 
 
Surprisingly, none of the critics to date addresses the possible repeal of § 83(b) 
while considering improvement to the current taxation of human capital.  In fac
some embrace elective choices as a positive, rather than a negative, feature of 
the Code.  They dispense with a valuation upon receipt approach for a profits 
interest in a partnership, yet fail to recognize that the recipien
t, 
ts of most restricted 
ompensatory transfers of equity interests avail themselves of such “topping off” 
its 
ed.  It is 




n.  The greater 
oncern should be about the potential conversion of compensatory income into 
 the re-investment of human capital as 
                                           
c
techniques under the current elective provision of § 83(b).   
 
By doing so, the difference between the tax treatment on receipt of a prof
interest in a partnership and a restricted capital interest in a partnership or 
restricted corporate stock is minimized, if not effectively eliminat
s
equity compensation, they would not demand such a reform.    
 
Service providers in receipt of an entrepreneurial interest, if fully informed, alm
without exception elect the acceleration of ordinary income.191  While sacrificing 
deferral, the rewards of conversion are maximized. An entrepreneur does not 
accept restricted stock unless he or she is confident that the period of service w
be fulfilled and is eager to “hitch his or her star” to a profitable endeavor.  In the
typical case, if the enterprise is successful, vastly greater amounts of ordinary 
income will be taken into account by the service provider without the election. 
Deferral is not a determinative consideration in making the electio
c
preferential treatment, which the election improperly facilitates.   
 
At a minimum, the election documents a congressional willingness to permit 
conversion in compensatory transfers of equity interests at minimal cost.192  
Much of this treatment is attributable to the entanglement of, and difficulty in 
separating, the amount of any return attributable to an investment of human 
capital and the amount attributable to its re-investment in the enterprise, which is 
treated as invested capital.  Critics ignore
 
190 “The election is consistent with our tax system’s usual method of handling executive 
compensation valuation problems.”  Id at 54. 
 
191 See supra note 105. 
 
192 Conf. Rep. No 91-782 (1969) suggests that the subsection was a last minute addition and was 
done in order to “add flexibility.” 
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constituting a return on invested capital in their effort to determine the amount of 
the return attributable to human capital.  
 
Of all aspects of the current tax law which could be reformed, the § 83(b) electio
is most in need.  While concer
n 
ned about tax gamesmanship, some fail to 




nly through the passage of time and the ongoing rendition of 
rvices will economic enhancement accrue. To permit an election which 
t with 
 treatment 
would extend equally to partnerships and corporations, and its implementation by 
simple, involving nothing more than the repeal of a mere 
ubsection of a single Code provision less than 170 words in length. 
u
target the most questionable aspect of the current law regarding compensatory 
transfers of equity interests.   
 
In determining when a return constitutes a return on human capital or a return 
invested capital, the least defensible approach from a tax policy standpoint is 
permitting the return on human capital to be measured on the date of receipt, 
before any of the services have been rendered, at a time when the only thi
which is certain is that the service provider lacks complete dominion and contr
over the interest.  O
se
determines the return on human capital before any of it has been rendered is 
counter-intuitive.   
   
Some have focused on the right issue, but the wrong target.  With assistance 
from Shakespeare, “the fault lies not with [profits interests], dear Brutus, bu
[§83(b)].”193  Dramatic improvement in the policy principles for the taxation of 
human capital can and should be made.  The revenue gain from the elimination 
of the election could be significant.  More importantly, tax policy would be 
advanced, similarly-situated parties would be treated consistently, the




Some assert that the current tax treatment of a compensatory transfer of a p
interest in a partnership results in a widely-exploited tax subsidy.  In fact, these
efforts have garnered Congressional attention.  While unfortunately centered in a





e message, quoting multi-millionaires (or is it billionaires?) as questioning the 
fairness of a tax system which taxes more heavily the wages of such individuals’ 
   
                                         
194  Furthermore, the popular press has embraced 
th
administrative assistants than the returns of such high-flying service providers.195
   
eads:  “The fault lies not 
ith our stars, dear Brutus, but with ourselves.” 
 note 2, at 59. See also discussion supra note 20. 
007, available at 









While these reform efforts fell short and were not enacted into law, possibly due
to the forthcoming elections of November, 2008,
 
and 





e in the partnership context is 
r more limited than it is in the corporate context. 
 
ould 
would generate tax results superior to 
ose of a profits interest in a partnership. 
w. 
 of zeros which follow the initial digit in 
e amount of the compensatory return.    
          
196 predictions abound that the 
“issue is likely to come up again as part of a debate over tax reform in 2009.”197  
Importantly, in revisiting the issue, the tax writing committees need to ignore the 
populist calls for reforms and instead explore the structure of Subchapter K 
Subchapter C and determine the proper policy treatment for the taxation of 
human capital in all contexts.  Only through a consideration of the entirety of the 
s
 
The difficulty with the current class warfare rhetoric is its myopic focus upo
single industry and its inaccurate assumption that profits interests always 
generate deferral and conversion.  As has been illustrated, the deferral aspect o
the receipt of a profits interest comports with tax policy principles of realization
valuation, and vesting.  Furthermore, deferral in the partnership context is far 
more abbreviated than it is in the corporate context.  Regarding the conversion 
feature, it is not unique to compensatory transfers of a profits interest.  It e
exists with respect to the other four traditional types of equity interests of 
business enterprises.  In fact, the conversion featur
fa
 
The allegation that a compensatory profits interest receives preferential tax
treatment superior to the other four types of equity interests is erroneous.  
Furthermore, instead of achieving the neutrality to which any tax system sh
aspire, if the proposed treatment were adopted, virtually all other forms of 
compensatory transfers of equity interests 
th
 
Notwithstanding the lack of theoretical or tax policy distinctions between profits 
interests and carried interests, some call for selective application of reform only 
to large investment partnerships, revealing a class warfare strategy as opposed 
to a uniform overall improvement in the operation and application of the tax la
Attack the superrich, even when their return on compensatory endeavors is 
indistinguishable in every respect from the profits interest received by others 
except for the number of dollars involved.  Sound tax policy deserves more than 
arbitrary line-drawing based on the number
th
 
                                                                                                                        
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article19959
31.ece. See also supra note 6 (listing a sample of incendiary articles appearing in the media). 
 
196 President elect Barack Obama was one of the co-sponsors of S. 1624, the Baucus-Grassley 
Bill, which may impact the future of any such proposed legislation. See supra note 116.   
 
197 Fleischer, supra note 2, at 59.  However, any prediction has become more suspect than usual 
due to the economic meltdown of October 2008. 
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Some boldly assert that the “status quo treatment of a profits interest in a 
partnership is no longer a tenable position to take as a matter of sound tax 
policy.”198  Considering the above discussion, such a conclusion is questionable.  
All five types of equity interests share common treatment with respect to the 
issues of deferral and conversion.  More importantly, upon studying the statutory
treatment of the entirety of compensatory equity transfers, one app
 
reciates the 
omplexity encountered in attempting to determine what constitutes a return on 
y 
.  Like conjoined twins, delineation between 
e two is virtually impossible, and any attempt to disentangle them is fraught 
 
fficulty 
ncountered in segregating the respective components of the overall financial 
rest, 
nt 
ttributable exclusively to human capital nor invested capital, the 
urrent status quo has as much justification for its continuation as the adoption of 
 
d corporate transactions.  
imilarly, the law has addressed the range of compensatory transfers including 
                                           
c
human capital and what constitutes a return on invested capital.   
 
This conceptual challenge is particularly difficult in the case of a compensator
receipt of an equity interest in an enterprise.  Once a compensatory equity 
interest is received, the clarity of the return on human capital begins to blur.  
Human capital begets invested capital, which begets invested capital, which 
begets invested capital, ad infinatum
th
with difficult obstacles.   
 
As has been illustrated by the analysis of the advanced proposals, none appears
to be superior to the status quo.  In fact, the current tax treatment of the issue, 
with some slight improvement, may be the “second best’ solution to the di
e
return from the receipt of compensatory equity interests in an enterprise. 
 
Returns on human capital, if not withdrawn, generate invested capital throughout 
the period of equity ownership by the service provider.  The value of the inte
provided the enterprise proves profitable, becomes attributable to the investme
of both human capital and invested capital.  Disentangling the two could be 
accomplished by any number of means.  However, upon recognizing that the 




The current tax treatment of such recipients produces a reasonable compromise, 
reflecting the re-investment of human capital which becomes invested capital.  
While it may begin as one, it transforms into another.  The governing structure of
the Code provides clear and certain rules for the taxation of returns as ordinary 
income or capital gain in the context of partnership an
S
the receipt of profits interests, restricted stock, etc.   
 
 
198 Id.  In an earlier version of an article placed on SSRN, possibly having surveyed the tax 
professoriate, one advocate asserted:  “In the midst of the chaos and controversy that has 
followed, it’s worth noting that there is (near) academic consensus on [the] issue. . . .”  Victor 
Fleischer,Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds 51 (U of Colorado 
Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-27, 2007), available at SSRN: 











at normative tax 
eatment should be.  The repeal of § 83(b) would constitute meaningful tax 
form with regard to the proper taxation of human capital. 
 
 
As illustrated above, unifying themes bind the various available compensatory 
techniques and profits interests, whether termed carried interests or otherwise, 
are consistent therewith. Once evaluated in the overall context, it is apparen
the hue and cry over private equity funds is much ado about nothing.  Ironically
as our economic meltdown continues, instead of withdrawing 
re
consider increasing the benefits associated with risk taking.  
 
Nevertheless, reform opportunities in the area present themselves.  The e
of § 83(b), which permits an undervaluation of the return on human capital before 
it has even been received, is a far more serious affront to the proper tax 
treatment for compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise than 
current tax treatment for profits interests in a partnership.  Yet, there appears
have been deafening silence regarding its deviation from wh
tr
re
 
 
 
